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I. INTRODUCTION 
For years prior to the decision in Kisor v. Wilkie,1 commentators had 
speculated that the Supreme Court would eventually reverse course on the 
principle of agency deference.2 Yet in Kisor the Court elected not to 
overturn two earlier decisions that directed courts to defer to an agency’s 
reasonable interpretation of its own ambiguous rule.3 How did the Court 
come to a decision that seemed to go against all expectations? Answering 
this question ultimately reveals the following: the decision in Kisor 
represents a striking illustration of the law of unintended consequences at 
work—a principle often referred to as the cobra effect.4 
Any affirmative action to resolve a problem that results in making 
the problem worse is said to illustrate the cobra effect.5 The phrase has its 
roots in colonial India; it was coined after the British government put a 
bounty on dead cobras in order to rid the capital city of its growing snake 
problem. In response, the citizens of Delhi began breeding cobras to earn 
the reward and released them after the government scrapped the offer. 
1. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019). 
2. See Standard of Review—Deference to Administrative Agencies, 34 No. 8 FED. LITIGATOR
(Thomson Reuters, Toronto, Ont., Can., Aug. 2019), at NL 7 (“[T]wo flavors of judicial deference to 
agency interpretations—Auer deference for agency interpretations of the agency’s regulations and 
Chevron deference for agency interpretations of the statutes directing the agency to develop 
regulations—have drawn substantial criticism in recent years, with calls for both to be overturned.”). 
3. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2424. 
4. Stevie Borrello, The Cobra Effect, QUARTZ WEEKLY OBSESSION (Oct. 11, 2019),
https://qz.com/emails/quartz-obsession/1726565/ [https://perma.cc/T7N4-R6YC]. 
5. See, e.g., Antony Davies & James R. Harrigan, The Cobra Effect: Lessons in Unintended
Consequences, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC. (Sept. 6, 2019), https://fee.org/articles/the-cobra-effect-
lessons-in-unintended-consequences/ [https://perma.cc/32ZM-2PRX]. The term “cobra effect” was 
likely first introduced to describe this phenomenon by German economist Horst Siebert in his book, 
Der Kobra-Effekt. See generally HORST SIEBERT, DER KOBRA-EFFEKT: WIE MAN IRRWEGE DER 
WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK VERMEIDET (2001); Stephen J. Dunbar, The Cobra Effect, Freakonomics (Oct. 
11, 2012, 9:28 AM), https://freakonomics.com/podcast/the-cobra-effect-a-new-freakonomics-radio-
podcast/ [https://perma.cc/MZF5-XGSW] (describing “the Cobra Effect” as “a term popularized by 
the late German economist Horst Siebert”); Borrello, supra note 4 (explaining that the Cobra Effect 
was “[c]oined by German economist Horst Siebert in his 2001 book of the same name . . . .”). 
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This left the city with more cobras than existed before the bounty.6 And 
so it was with the Kisor decision: the unintended consequence of Chief 
Justice John Roberts’s well-meaning efforts to protect the Court’s 
institutional reputation. 
Courts have accorded deference to agency interpretations of statutes 
and regulations for decades, following the 1945 decision in Bowles v. 
Seminole Rock7 and 35 years later with Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc.8 The two principles of deference are 
markedly different. Under Chevron, “a court must give effect to an 
agency’s . . . reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute,”9 while 
Seminole Rock deference requires the court to defer to “an agency’s 
interpretation of its own regulation.”10 The Supreme Court reaffirmed and 
expanded Seminole Rock in 1997 in Auer v. Robbins,11 and the principle 
of deference it established has been referred to as “Auer deference” ever 
since.12 
In the years following Auer, the Court has given every indication that 
time was running out on agency deference, particularly Auer deference.13 
Conservative members of the Court, such as Justices Scalia and Thomas, 
have been particularly critical of all forms of agency deference in the last 
6. This story is available from multiple sources. See, e.g., LESLIE H. BRICKMAN, PREPARING 
THE 21ST CENTURY CHURCH 326–27 (2002); Davies & Harrigan, supra note 5; Shawn Langlois, The 
“Cobra Effect” Will Have a “Disastrous and Unimaginable” Impact on the Market, Wall Street Vet 
Warns, MARKETWATCH (July 25, 2020, 8:10 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-cobra-
effect-will-have-a-disastrous-and-unimaginable-impact-on-the-market-wall-street-vet-warns-2020-
07-22 [https://perma.cc/S54G-5W8X]. 
7. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945). 
8. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
9. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 586–87 (2000). 
10. Id. at 588. 
11. See generally Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); see also Paul J. Larkin, Jr. & 
Elizabeth H. Slattery, The World After Seminole Rock and Auer, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 625, 
635 (2019) (“The Court not only reaffirmed Seminole Rock in 1997 in Auer v. Robbins, but also 
applied the deference rule well beyond the original limited context of Seminole Rock.”). 
12. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2411 (2019) (“Before the doctrine was called Auer 
deference, it was called Seminole Rock deference . . . .”). 
13. See Standard of Review – Deference to Administrative Agencies, supra note 2; Adam 
Liptak, Limiting Agency Power, a Goal of the Right, Gets Supreme Court Test, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/27/us/politics/supreme-court-agency-power.html 
[https://perma.cc/4N4D-AXFQ] (explaining that Seminole Rock and Auer “have been the subject of 
much criticism, and several justices have urged the Supreme Court to revisit them”); Christopher 
Walker, Judge Kavanaugh on Administrative Law and Separation of Powers, SCOTUSBLOG (July 
26, 2018, 2:55 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/07/kavanaugh-on-administrative-law-and-
separation-of-powers/ [https://perma.cc/R7MX-FXH2] (“In recent years, there has been a growing 
call (mainly from those right-of-center) to eliminate — or at least narrow — administrative law’s 
judicial-deference doctrines regarding federal agency interpretations of law.”). 
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twenty years.14 This attitude among the justices reflects the perspective of 
the conservative legal community at large that administrative agencies 
have too much power.15 Justice Scalia, who originally penned the opinion 
in Auer, would eventually become one of its harshest critics.16 While 
continuing to endorse Chevron deference to the end, over time Scalia’s 
support became “more nuanced and laced with express concern.”17 He 
argued that it was inappropriate for the courts to abdicate to an agency the 
judiciary’s authority of interpretation, leaving this function to an 
executive branch agency and thereby raising separation-of-powers 
concerns.18 Justice Thomas went further, referring to Auer deference as 
“unconstitutional,”19 while Justice Kavanaugh indicated his distaste for 
Auer even before joining the Court in 2018.20 Meanwhile, Justice 
14. See Robert V. Percival, Despite Attacks on Judicial Deference, Reports of Auer’s Demise
are Premature, 48 No. 4 TRENDS (A.B.A. Sec. of Env’t, Energy and Resources, Chi., Ill.), 
March/April, 2017, at 5–6 (“The late Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, 
campaigned against a . . . form of judicial deference known as Seminole Rock or Auer 
deference . . . .”).  
15. See generally Elizabeth Slattery, Who Will Regulate the Regulators? 3 (Heritage Found.,
Legal Memorandum No. 153, May 7, 2015), https://www.heritage.org/courts/report/who-will-
regulate-the-regulators-administrative-agencies-the-separation-powers-and [https://perma.cc/2K9Y-
PMRA] (describing the expansive role of administrative agencies, and the “massive amounts of 
power” they wield, “with little oversight,” as amounting to “precisely the accumulation of power that 
Madison feared”); see also Nicholas Bagley, ‘Most of Government is Unconstitutional’, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/21/opinion/sunday/gundy-united-states.html 
[https://perma.cc/7GRZ-PG89] (“[P]owerful agencies have long generated anxiety among 
conservatives.”). 
16. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 110 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(explaining that Auer deference gives agencies too much power, giving them an “exemption from 
notice-and-comment rulemaking”); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 617 (2013) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in part) (asserting, in answer to the respondent’s request that the Court reconsider Auer, 
“I believe that it is time to do so”). 
17. David Tarrien, The Legacy of Justice Scalia: Liberal Lion? An Examination of Chevron 
Deference, Net Neutrality, and Possible Outcomes of a Supreme Court Decision on the Federal 
Communication Commission’s Open Internet Order, 17 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 233, 245 (2016). 
18. Decker, 568 U.S. at 621 (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (explaining that any efficiency
benefit derived from Auer deference “cannot justify a rule that . . . contravenes one of the great rules 
of separate of powers: He who writes the law must not adjudge its violation.”).  
19. Perez, 575 U.S. at 112 (Thomas, J., concurring) (expressing concern that Auer deference, 
by allowing agencies to interpret their own rules, “effects a transfer of the judicial power to an 
executive agency [that] raises constitutional concerns”). 
20. See The C. Boyden Gray Center, Keynote Address: Justice Scalia and Deference, VIMEO 
at 18:33 (June 2, 2016), https://vimeo.com/169758593 [https://perma.cc/BC35-SY3J] (Hon. Brett 
Kavanaugh, D.C. Cir., describing Justice Scalia’s view that Auer deference was “a dangerous 
permission slip for the arrogation of power” and explaining that there are “huge practical 
consequences for individual liberty when the law writer is also the law interpreter”). 
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Gorsuch, though not addressing Auer directly, has expressed opposition 
to agency deference in the form of Chevron deference.21 
Chief Justice John Roberts was perhaps the most reserved among the 
conservative wing of the Court in his criticism of agency deference.22 Yet, 
in a 2013 concurring opinion, he too suggested that Auer and Seminole 
Rock warranted review.23 The Court, he wrote, “is now aware that there is 
some interest in reconsidering those cases.”24 More to the point, he 
suggested that Auer deference faced an uncertain future, asserting that “it 
may be appropriate to reconsider that principle in an appropriate case.”25 
That “appropriate case” arguably came in 2019 in the form of Kisor. 
But the Court in Kisor left Auer deference intact, while significantly 
restricting its applicability.26 Technically, Kisor was a unanimous 
decision, with all nine justices agreeing that the case should be sent down 
to the lower court for reconsideration.27 But the justices split five to four 
on the reasoning, with the majority holding that a court’s deference to an 
agency’s interpretation under Auer was warranted only after “exhaust[ing] 
all the ‘traditional tools’ of construction.”28 
Beyond the principle of agency deference, there was much more at 
stake in Kisor. First, there was the principle of stare decisis. Had the Court 
overturned Auer (and Seminole Rock with it), Kisor would have 
represented the fourth case in its last two terms in which the Court 
overturned well-settled law.29 Writing for the majority in Kisor, Justice 
Kagan asserted that stare decisis was a significant hurdle to overturning 
Auer.30 Doing so, she argued, would require the Court “to overrule not a 
21. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1158 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that without the principle of Chevron deference, “courts would then fulfill 
their duty to exercise their independent judgment about what the law is”). 
22. See Matthew C. Turk & Karen E. Woody, Justice Kavanaugh, Lorenzo v. SEC, and the
Post-Kennedy Supreme Court, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 193, 247 (2019) (describing Chief Justice Roberts 
as a member of a “soft anti-Chevron camp”: those justices who express their opinions opposing 
Chevron deference with a “soft” voice, in contrast with the others, such as Justice Scalia, who argued 
against Chevron deference with a “loud” voice). 
23. Decker, 568 U.S. at 615–16 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
24. Id. at 616. 
25. Id. at 615. 
26. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2408 (2019). 
27. Id. at 2407. See also id. at 2423 (“[T]he Federal Circuit jumped the gun in declaring the
regulation ambiguous . . . .”). 
28. Id. at 2415. 
29. See Knick v. Township of Scott, Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019); Franchise Tax Bd. 
of Cal. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019); Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 
31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
30. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2418. 
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single case, but a ‘long line of precedents’—each one reaffirming the rest 
and going back 75 years or more.”31 
For all the disdain several justices had previously expressed for Auer 
deference, as well as Chevron deference, the attention paid to stare decisis 
in Kisor reflected a second, perhaps more fundamental issue at stake: the 
reputation, credibility, and legitimacy of the Court as an institution. 
Evidence shows increased scrutiny of the Court in the few years leading 
up to Kisor,32 while public approval of the Court had been declining.33 
Disagreements among the justices, even highly contentious ones, are 
nothing new. But events outside the Court put the Court and its 
proceedings in a political context that may have adversely affected public 
perceptions of the Court’s institutional legitimacy.34 Two obvious 
examples include the 2016 fight between the Republican Congress and 
President Obama over Supreme Court nominee Merrick Garland, and the 
highly divisive confirmation hearings of Justice Kavanaugh in 2018, 
complete with allegations of sexual misconduct and political 
malfeasance.35 
The Kisor decision also draws attention to the ability of the Chief 
Justice to impact the Court’s proceedings and influence its reputation. It 
is the Chief Justice, after all, who has traditionally borne the ultimate 
responsibility for managing and cultivating the integrity of the Supreme 
Court in historical, institutional, and even political contexts.36 Chief 
Justice Roberts is no exception, expressing on numerous occasions his 
concern for the Court’s reputation and a willingness to act for its 
31. Id. at 2422. 
32. Henry Gass, John Roberts’s Mission Impossible for the Supreme Court, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2016/1116/John-Roberts-s-
mission-impossible-for-the-Supreme-Court [https://perma.cc/XL42-UWDZ]. 
33. In Depth: Topics A to Z, Supreme Court, GALLUP NEWS, https://news.gallup.com/ 
poll/4732/supreme-court.aspx [https://perma.cc/URG4-8YJR]. (The question asked was, “Do you 
approve or disapprove of the way the Supreme Court is handling its job?”). 
34. See Eric Hamilton, Politicizing the Supreme Court, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 35, 36
(2012). 
35. Michael Tomasky, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/05/opinion/supreme-courts-legitimacy-crisis.html 
[https://perma.cc/XZ7T-M2B8] (referring to the Senate’s failure to vote on the nomination of Judge 
Merrick Garland as “breaking the rules;” the fact that Justice Gorsuch was the first justice nominated 
by a president who had not won the popular vote; that Justice Kavanaugh’s confirmation was marred 
by allegations of sexual misconduct; and multiple justices have now been confirmed by legislators 
representing minority support). 
36. Benjamin Pomerance, Center of Order: Chief Justice John Roberts and the Coming
Struggle for a Respected Supreme Court, 82 ALB. L. REV. 449, 463–64 (2019) (explaining the role of 
the Chief Justice as “a kind of gatekeeper of the institution’s reputation”). See also Peter G. Fish, The 
Office of the Chief Justice of the United States, in THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE 59 (1984) 
(“Chiefs have long sought to protect the status and political independence of their Court.”). 
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preservation.37 For example, Roberts has taken the unusual step of directly 
responding to external criticism directed at the Court. For example, he has 
responded to sharp comments from both President Obama38 and President 
Trump39 on separate occasions. Roberts also appears to be willing to put 
aside his inclinations in particular cases, voting with the more liberal 
justices to steer the Court into calmer waters.40 
Understood in this context, the opinion in Kisor may not be entirely 
surprising after all. In fact, it is perhaps entirely unsurprising that the 
decisive fifth vote in Kisor—the vote that kept Auer intact—came from 
Roberts, joining his more liberal colleagues.41 The Kisor result 
represented a win for stare decisis. But the decision ultimately did not 
represent a victory for the Court (or the lower courts, for that matter), as 
the version of Auer deference left behind following Kisor is weak, perhaps 
even untenable.42 
Thus, Kisor ultimately represents a high-stakes example of the cobra 
effect. By leaving Auer intact, but in a weakened state, the Court—and 
Roberts specifically—likely did more harm than good to the Court’s 
institutional reputation. Stability in the law comes not just from reliance 
on precedent. It comes from providing clear, decisive direction to the 
lower courts. It springs from overturning bad law. And it arises from the 
Court’s steadfast authority over the interpretation of the law. The outcome 
in Kisor may have also weakened all of these. 
37. See JOAN BISKUPIC, THE CHIEF 9 (2019) (“Roberts understood that public regard was
crucial to the Supreme Court’s stature in American life. He had studied the reputations of past Chief 
Justices . . . .”).  
38. David G. Savage, Chief Justice Unsettled by Obama’s Criticism of Supreme Court, L.A.
TIMES (Mar. 10, 2010), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2010-mar-10-la-na-roberts-
speech10-2010mar10-story.html [https://perma.cc/C2T4-7BTE]. 
39. Robert Barnes, Rebuking Trump’s Criticism of ‘Obama Judge,’ Chief Justice Roberts 




40. BISKUPIC, supra note 37, at 10 (“Yet Roberts has at times set aside his ideological and
political interests on behalf of his commitments to the Court’s institutional reputation and his own 
public image.”). 
41. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Limits Agency Power, a Goal of the Right, N.Y. TIMES (June 
26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/26/us/politics/supreme-court-agency-power.html 
[https://perma.cc/7WCS-KNTP] (“[T]he justices [in Kisor] largely split 5 to 4 on the reasoning, with 
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. joining the court’s four-member liberal wing to cast the decisive 
vote to retain the precedents.”). 
42. See, e.g., Eric S. Schmitt, Symposium: Kisor v. Wilkie – A Swing and a Miss, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2019, 12:46 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/symposium-kisor-
v-wilkie-a-swing-and-a-miss/ [https://perma.cc/G3GC-JX76]. 
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The following note will address these issues in three parts. First, Part 
II will provide a background of Kisor in the context of Auer deference, 
with a closer look at why the Court was inclined to overturn Auer. Part III 
will provide a review of the recent cases in which the Court overturned 
precedents. This will include a discussion of the importance of stare 
decisis as a basic self-governing principle within the judicial branch.43 
Further, Part III will then explore evidence of Roberts’s perspective on 
stare decisis, the Court’s reputation, and the role of the Chief Justice. 
Finally, Part IV will present an analysis of why the Court ought to 
overturn Auer, clearly and decisively, at the next opportunity. It should do 
so both because it is the correct move jurisprudentially and because doing 
so will ultimately serve the Court’s institutional reputation more than 
deference to stare decisis would. 
II. BACKGROUND: THE RISE AND ANTICIPATED
FALL OF AUER DEFERENCE 
A. Agency deference 
Courts interpret the law. In doing so, judges often look to a variety 
of sources to aid them in determining the most proper reading of the 
Constitution, statute, ordinance, regulation, or contract―all of which can 
often be ambiguous or vague.44 The federal agency responsible for the 
administration of a given statute or regulation has served as one such 
source for federal courts since 1944, with the holding in Skidmore v. Swift 
& Co.45 Since Skidmore, in the face of unyielding ambiguity in the text of 
laws in different cases, the Supreme Court has called for varying levels of 
deference to the views of the relevant administrative agencies. Three 
doctrines of agency deference commonly invoked by the courts are 
relevant to the issue at stake here. They are Skidmore deference, Chevron 
deference, and Seminole Rock deference, which later became Auer 
deference.46 This subsection will proceed to review each. 
43. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 490 (Alexander Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed., 1888). 
44. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2410 (2019) (“Begin with a familiar problem in
administrative law: For various reasons, regulations may be genuinely ambiguous.”). 
45. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
46. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 
1099 (2008) (explaining that “the Court’s deference practice functions along a continuum,” and 
describing Skidmore deference as falling on the less deferential end, with Chevron deference and 
Seminole Rock deference at the more deferential end of that continuum). See also Andrew Hessick, 
The Future of Administrative Deference, 41 CAMPBELL L. REV. 421, 422 (2019) (explaining that with 
Chevron and Auer, “courts have two doctrines of binding deference,” while under Skidmore deference 
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1. Skidmore Deference
Skidmore was one of many labor-related cases to come to the Court 
in the wake of New Deal legislation of the late 1930s, which also saw the 
growth of administrative agencies.47 In Skidmore, employees of a 
meatpacking plant sued for overtime wages under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA” or “the Act”). At issue was the 
interpretation of the term “working time” within the overtime provisions 
of the Act. The employees worked in the fire hall at the company’s plant. 
In this role, they worked 7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., Monday through Friday, 
but also spent up to four nights each week “on call” (either on-premise or 
“within hailing distance”) to answer alarms. The question was whether the 
time spent “on call” was “working time” under the Act such that those 
hours would count toward the employees’ overtime calculations.48 
In deriving its interpretation of “working time,” the Court relied in 
part on the views of the FLSA Administrator.49 The Administrator had 
addressed this very issue in an edition of an interpretative bulletin he 
occasionally published to serve as a guide to employers and employees on 
how the agency would apply the law in different circumstances. The Court 
noted that the Administrator’s conclusions were not authoritative, but 
were “entitled to respect.”50 
On the one hand, the Skidmore Court recognized that the 
Administrator’s findings “are not reached as a result of hearing adversary 
proceedings in which he finds facts from evidence and reaches 
conclusions of law from findings of fact.”51 As such, the Administrator is 
not fulfilling a truly judicial role, and so the conclusions he draws are not 
conclusive and binding on a district court “as an authoritative 
pronouncement of a higher court might [be].”52 At the same time, the 
Court also recognized that the Administrator’s representations and 
applications of the Act reflect his efforts in his official duties, with the 
benefit of more “specialized experience, broader investigations and 
information” than a judge would have.53 Ultimately, the Court held that 
“agency interpretations of the statutes they administer and of the regulations they promulgate are 
entitled to great weight—but they are not binding”). 
47. See RICHARD L. PACELLE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT IN A SEPARATION OF POWERS 
SYSTEM 111 (2015) (describing Skidmore as “[t]he first important New Deal era standard” that played 
a “fundamental role of the administrative state”).  
48. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 135–36. 
49. Id. at 137–38. 
50. Id. at 140. 
51. Id. at 139. 
52. Id. at 139. 
53. Id. 
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“[t]he fact that the Administrator’s policies and standards are not reached 
by trial in adversary form does not mean that they are not entitled to 
respect.”54 In other words, deference is due to the Administrator’s 
interpretation as input to the judge’s ultimate interpretive role. 
With this, the Court established a new rule of law that would be 
known as Skidmore deference. Under this doctrine, federal courts are to 
give an appropriate level of deference to an agency’s interpretation of a 
statute it administers, as one of many sources of interpretation reflecting 
“a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and 
litigants may properly resort for guidance.”55 Under Skidmore, the 
agency’s interpretation is persuasive, not controlling on courts. The 
Skidmore Court further stated that the level of deference afforded the 
agency would depend on a variety of factors that reflect the soundness of 
the agency’s reasoning.56 
2. Chevron Deference
The Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.57 established the principle of 
Chevron deference. Under the doctrine of Chevron deference, federal 
courts must defer to a federal agency’s construction of a statute the agency 
administers when the statutory language is ambiguous, so long as the 
agency’s interpretation is based upon a “permissible construction of the 
statute.”58 In Chevron, the Natural Resource Defense Council challenged 
an EPA regulation that the agency had issued in 1981 for purposes of 
implementing the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act. One provision 
of the regulation, which addressed “stationary sources” of air pollution, 
included a definition of “stationary source” that would allow states to treat 
all pollution sources within an industrial group as one source.59 The Court 
54. Id. at 139–40. 
55. Id. at 140. 
56. Id. (“The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness 
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade . . . .”). Descriptions of how 
Skidmore deference is to be applied have been provided by the Court in more recent cases as well. 
See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (explaining that agency 
interpretations are “entitled to respect . . . but only to the extent that those interpretations have the 
power to persuade” (internal punctuation removed)); Doe v. Leavitt, 552 F.3d 75, 81 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(describing the level of deference to afford an agency’s interpretation as based upon a “sliding scale”).  
57. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
58. Id. at 843. 
59. Under the 1977 amendments to the Act, states that have not met the agency’s air quality
standards had to meet certain requirements. One of these requirements was the establishment of a 
permit program regulating “new or modified major stationary sources” of air pollution within the 
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of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit set aside the agency’s regulation, and the 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the EPA’s interpretation of 
stationary source was permissible.60 Consistent with the Court’s view as 
expressed in Skidmore, the Court here explained that such deference to 
the agency’s interpretation was appropriate because “[j]udges are not 
experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the 
Government.”61 
3. Seminole Rock or Auer Deference
Just a year after Skidmore, the Court decided Bowles v. Seminole 
Rock & Sand Co., which expanded on Skidmore in two critical ways.62 
First, unlike Skidmore or Chevron, the principle of Seminole Rock 
deference (and Auer deference with it) applies in cases where an agency 
regulation, rather than a statute, is at issue.63 Second, Seminole Rock 
directed courts to yield to the agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous 
rule, such that the agency’s interpretation is authoritative, not merely 
persuasive. Only when the agency’s interpretation is “plainly erroneous 
or inconsistent with the regulation” should the court not give it 
“controlling weight.”64 
Auer deference arose following the case of Auer v. Robbins in 
1997.65 It is not so much a stand-alone form of agency deference as a 
rebranded form of Seminole Rock deference.66 As with a Chevron 
analysis, courts applying Auer must first determine whether the agency 
state. For such stationary sources, a permit was to be issued only if the entity seeking the permit met 
specific, strict conditions. But by defining “stationary source” as it did in the ensuing 1981 regulation, 
states would be able to treat all pollution control devices in a single plant as if they were encased in a 
“bubble.” A company could thus install or modify equipment in a plant without meeting the new 
source requirements, so long as doing so did not increase the total emissions from the plant as a whole. 
This gave businesses the flexibility to meet the requirements by offsetting increased emissions from 
one building by reducing them elsewhere within the same plant. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837, 840–41. 
See also Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (May 14, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/enrd/chevron-usa-v-natural-res-def-council [https://perma.cc/UT3R-MP76]. 
60. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866. 
61. Id. at 865. 
62. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945). 
63. See Conor Clarke, The Uneasy Case Against Auer and Seminole Rock, 33 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 175, 175 (describing Chevron deference as applying “when Congress leaves an 
ambiguous gap in a piece of legislation,” and Auer deference as that which “applies to agencies’ 
interpretations of their own regulations”) (emphasis removed). 
64. Bowles, 325 U.S. at 414, 417–18. 
65. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
66. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2411 (2019) (“For the past 20 or so years, we have
referred to that doctrine as Auer deference . . . . But the name is something of a misnomer. Before the 
doctrine was called Auer deference, it was called Seminole Rock deference.”). 
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rule is clear or ambiguous.67 As Auer deference stood prior to the Kisor 
decision, if a court determined that a regulation was ambiguous, the 
agency’s interpretation was binding as long as it was reasonable.68 While 
Auer is perhaps less familiar than Chevron, it is no less significant. As 
Chief Justice Roberts has alluded, Auer goes “to the heart of 
administrative law,” and applications of the doctrine “arise as a matter of 
course on a regular basis.”69 
In Auer, the St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners denied 
overtime pay to a group of the city’s police sergeants, under an exemption 
in the FLSA. The Secretary of Labor filed an amicus brief in which he 
provided an interpretation of the statutory exemption.70 The Court held, 
consistent with Seminole Rock, that an interpretation of the statutory 
exemption provided by the Secretary of Labor, whose department 
administered the FLSA, was “a creature of the Secretary’s own 
regulations,” and thus “controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation.’”71 
The very notion of deference in the context of a court decision is 
significant. Black’s Law Dictionary defines deference as “showing 
respect for somebody or something” and “a polite or respectful attitude.”72 
This definition may accurately describe Skidmore deference,73 but both 
Chevron and Auer deference may be better described as the courts bowing 
to the authority of another branch of government.74 That courts relinquish 
power to another branch is likely one reason why agency deference has 
been described as “quite possibly the single most important concept in all 
67. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2414 (describing how under Auer, “the possibility of deference can
arise only if a regulation is genuinely ambiguous”). See also Clarke, supra note 63, at 190 (“[B]efore 
the Court asks whether the agency’s interpretation is plainly erroneous, it asks whether the regulation 
in question is actually ambiguous.”).  
68. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). 
69. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 616 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
70. Auer, 519 U.S. at 454‒55. 
71. Id. at 461 (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)). 
72. Deference, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
73. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (holding that the “rulings, 
interpretations and opinions” of the agency have the “power to persuade, if lacking power to control”).  
74. Generally, with either Chevron or Auer deference, the court is to give an administrative
agency’s reasonable interpretation controlling weight. See Stephen M. DeGenaro, Note, Why Should 
We Care About an Agency’s Special Insight? 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 909, 909 (2013) (explaining 
that under Chevron “an agency’s permissible construction of an ambiguous statute is to be given 
controlling weight” and “the Supreme Court’s holding in . . . Seminole Rock . . . gave controlling 
weight to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation”) (internal quotations 
omitted).  
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of legal thought.”75 But while the agency’s interpretation is given 
controlling weight under both Auer and Chevron, these are not equivalent 
forms of deference, and the difference is significant. With Auer deference, 
“an agency serves as both the drafter and the interpreter of ambiguous 
regulations,” which empowers the agency to make the law and then 
control its interpretation, potentially undermining the authority of both 
Congress and the courts.76 
B. Kisor: the petitioner asked the Court to overturn Auer 
In Kisor v. Wilkie, a Vietnam War veteran seeking retroactive 
disability benefits urged the Court to overturn Auer, and many observers 
seemed sure it would do so.77 Instead, the Court upheld Auer but tightened 
the reins on its application by the courts.78 
James Kisor was a retired U.S. Marine whom the Department of 
Veterans Affairs (VA) had denied disability benefits dating back to 
1982.79 The VA reopened his case in 2006, at which time the department 
granted his benefits, but only from that date, not retroactively. An appeals 
board agreed with the decision, based on its interpretation of the agency 
rule governing such claims. The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 
affirmed the board’s decision. Applying Auer deference, the Federal 
Circuit also affirmed, concluding that the VA regulation was ambiguous, 
so the Board’s interpretation was controlling.80 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari for the specific purpose of 
deciding whether to overrule Auer.81 The Court unanimously agreed the 
75. GARY LAWSON & GUY I. SEIDMAN, DEFERENCE: THE LEGAL CONCEPT AND THE LEGAL 
PRACTICE 3 (2019). 
76. DeGenaro, supra note 74, at 911 (explaining that the key difference between Chevron 
deference and Auer deference is that with Auer deference “an agency serves as both the drafter and 
interpreter of ambiguous regulations”). 
77. Clarke, supra note 63, at 175–76 (“The future of Auer is also in doubt. . . . [C]ommentators 
have chipped away at Auer’s foundations . . . . [and these] concerns have started to stir interest with 
the Supreme Court.”). See also Tom Lorenzen, Dan Wolff, & Sharmistha Das, The Final Auer: 
Midnight Approaches for an Important Deference Doctrine, TRENDS (A.B.A. Sec. of Env’t, Energy 
and Resources, Chi., Ill.) Mar. 8, 2019, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
environment_energy_resources/publications/trends/2018-2019/march-april-2019/the-final-auer/ 
[https://perma.cc/5YN7-2PGM] (“In Kisor v. Wilkie, the Supreme Court stands poised to banish Auer 
deference . . . . For Court watchers, it was just a matter of time.”).  
78. See Supreme Court Limits Rule That Requires Judges to Defer to Agencies, THOMSON 
REUTERS TAX & ACCT. (July 1, 2019), https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/news/supreme-court-limits-
rule-that-requires-judges-to-defer-to-agencies/ [https://perma.cc/ST7W-BFDP]. 
79. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2409 (2019). 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 2408 (“The only question presented here is whether we should overrule [Auer and 
Seminole Rock], discarding the deference they give to agencies.”).  
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case should be remanded to the lower court for reconsideration, 
admonishing the lower court for not working hard enough to interpret the 
meaning of the regulation.82 The opinion by Justice Kagan also explained 
that “the Federal Circuit assumed too fast that Auer deference should 
apply in the event of genuine ambiguity. As we have explained, that is not 
always true. A court must assess whether the interpretation is of the sort 
that Congress would want to receive deference.”83 
The Court in Kisor went further, prescribing a strict five-step process 
of analysis for courts considering Auer deference in a given case. First, 
Auer deference applies only after the court has established that the 
regulation in question is “genuinely ambiguous.”84 Second, if there is 
ambiguity, the agency’s interpretation is valid only if it is reasonable.85 
Third, the agency’s interpretation must reflect the agency’s official 
statement regarding the statute and its interpretation; it cannot be merely 
a generalized ad hoc statement.86 Fourth, the agency’s interpretation must 
arise from the agency’s expertise on the subject matter.87 Fifth, and 
finally, the interpretation must reflect “fair and considered judgment” of 
the issue88 and ought not to represent a new interpretation or one that 
conflicts with a prior one.89 
The decision in Kisor was unanimous, but the opinion was not. On 
the issue of whether to overturn Auer, the Court voted five to four against, 
with Roberts joining Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Ginsburg, and Breyer to 
form the majority.90 In the opinion, written by Kagan, the Court noted 
“stare decisis cuts strongly against” overruling Auer deference.91 
C. Why Auer’s days appeared to be numbered 
Individual members of the Supreme Court have made statements, 
both in court (by way of judicial opinions, often in dissent) and out of 
82. Id. at 2423–24 (“[T]he Federal Circuit jumped the gun in declaring the regulation
ambiguous. . . . Rather, the court must make a conscientious effort to determine, based on indicia like 
text, structure, history, and purpose, whether the regulation really has more than one reasonable 
meaning.”).  
83. Id. at 2424. 
84. Id. at 2415 (“[A] court cannot wave the ambiguity flag just because it found the regulation 
impenetrable on first read.”). 
85. Id. at 2415–16. 
86. Id. at 2421. 
87. Id. at 2417. 
88. Id. at 2417. 
89. Id. at 2418. 
90. Id. at 2404. 
91. Id. at 2422. 
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court (in public presentations or interviews), which have road-mapped a 
course to overturning Auer, if not Chevron.92 Their arguments are 
persuasive. 
The primary argument in favor of overturning Auer, and thus in 
opposition to the principle of Auer deference specifically and agency 
deference in general, is that it “offends the core principle of the separation 
of powers.”93 Auer in particular is held to be “extremely deferential,” 
removing a court’s discretion and, with it, the court’s interpretive 
authority over ambiguity in regulatory rules.94 Auer, it is argued, compels 
the court to hand over its judicial role to the agency that promulgated the 
regulation in question.95 Further, because Auer deference leads courts to 
turn over interpretive authority to the agencies, those agencies are 
encouraged to write rules with ambiguity, so they can later manipulate the 
meaning toward whatever end serves them at that time.96 
Although Justice Scalia is no longer a part of the Court, his attitudes 
about Auer deference helped to shape the current argument, both for and 
against it. To be sure, Scalia was initially a proponent of Auer deference. 
He wrote the majority opinion in the 1997 case that gave it its name.97 But 
starting in 2011, with Talk America v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 
Scalia would express discomfort with the very notion of Auer deference, 
even to the point of questioning why the Court (why he) had ever 
considered it a good idea.98 In Talk America, writing in a concurring 
opinion, he referred to Auer deference, noting that he had “in the past 
uncritically accepted that rule” but had since “become increasingly 
doubtful of its validity.”99 More to the point, Scalia stated that when the 
Court is eventually asked to reconsider Auer he would “be receptive to 
92. See infra notes 93–113. 
93. Cynthia Barmore, Auer in Action: Deference After Talk America, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 813, 
817 (2015). 
94. Alhambra Hosp. v. Thompson, 259 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). 
95. Barmore, supra note 93, at 817‒18. 
96. Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1449, 1461 (2011) (describing Auer deference as having “the perverse effect of undermining 
agencies’ incentives to adopt clear regulations . . .” because under Auer, an agency will know that 
when its rules are ambiguous “it will be able to control their subsequent interpretation”). See also 
Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 111–12 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining that 
giving deference to an agency allows that agency’s rules to live outside the boundaries of notice-and-
comment, and noting that “there are weighty reasons to deny a lawgiver the power to write ambiguous 
laws and then be the judge of what the ambiguity means”).  
97. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 454 (1997). 
98. Talk America, Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 67–69 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). 
99. Id. at 68. 
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doing so.”100 He would go on to make the case against Auer deference, 
and call for overturning it, in numerous subsequent cases.101 
Justice Thomas has been the most critical of Auer deference, 
questioning its validity under the Constitution.102 In a concurring opinion 
in 2015, he wrote that Auer deference “raises constitutional concerns” 
because it “effects a transfer of the judicial power to an executive agency” 
and “undermines [the Court’s] obligation to provide a judicial check on 
the other branches.”103 
Justice Kavanaugh was a vocal critic of Auer deference while serving 
on the D.C. Circuit. In a 2016 speech, then-Judge Kavanaugh cited Scalia 
when he stated that “Auer violates a fundamental principle of separation 
of powers.”104 Kavanaugh went on to directly assert his prediction that 
“Auer will someday be overruled and that Justice Scalia’s dissent in 
Decker will be the law of the land.”105 
Justice Gorsuch has also been a critic of agency deference in general, 
most notably addressing concerns about Chevron deference. Thus, he 
foreshadowed his dissent in Kisor while still serving on the Tenth Circuit 
Court in his concurring opinion in Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch.106 “Under 
any conception of our separation of powers,” Gorsuch wrote, “I would 
have thought powerful and centralized authorities like today’s 
administrative agencies would have warranted less deference from other 
branches, not more.”107 Addressing the question directly he stated, “We 
managed to live with the administrative state before Chevron. We could 
do it again.”108 
During Gorsuch’s confirmation hearings before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, Senator Orrin Hatch asked him to elaborate on his views 
regarding Chevron deference. In his response, echoing the Constitutional 
100.  Id. at 69. 
 101.  See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 616–17 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (arguing with apparent dismay that the Court has applied Auer deference 
“[f]or decades, and for no good reason,” and that the time had come to overturn it); Perez v. Mortg. 
Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 109, 111–12 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing Auer as “an 
elaborate law of deference” that encourages agencies to “write substantive rules more broadly and 
vaguely, leaving plenty of gaps to be filled in later,” which the Court can best address “by abandoning 
Auer”). 
102.  See Percival, supra note 14, at 5 (“Justice Thomas is the only current Justice who has 
declared Auer deference unconstitutional.”). 
103.  Perez, 575 U.S. at 112–13 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
104.  The C. Boyden Gray Center, supra note 20, at 18:19 (June 2, 2016). 
105.  Id. at 19:05. 
106.  Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 2016). 
107.  Id. at 1155. 
108.  Id. at 1158. 
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concerns raised earlier by Thomas and Scalia, Gorsuch asked, “What 
about the separation of powers? I thought that judges were supposed to 
say what the law is.”109 
Prior to Kisor, the Chief Justice had also questioned the wisdom of 
Auer and other forms of agency deference, though certainly with less 
vigor than his fellow conservative justices.110 In Decker, in 2013, he had 
suggested that the issue warranted reconsideration.111 That same year, in 
a different case, Roberts wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued 
more forcefully in opposition to judicial deference to agencies. In City of 
Arlington v. F.C.C., he asserted that “[a] court should not defer to an 
agency until the court decides, on its own, that the agency is entitled to 
deference.”112 His concern, as expressed in that case, was about the risk 
of the growing administrative state, urging the Court to “not leave it to the 
agency to decide when it is in charge.”113 
By the time the Court heard oral arguments for Kisor in early 2019, 
Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Gorsuch had firmly established their opposition 
to agency deference. The Chief Justice, too, had at least hinted that he had 
significant issues with it. Therefore, it would have been reasonable to 
believe that, with Kisor, the Court would finally overturn Auer. 
III. STARE DECISIS AND THE COURT’S REPUTATION
Three cases over the 2017 and 2018 terms established stare decisis 
as something more than a jurisprudential doctrine for the Supreme Court. 
It became the Court’s lightning rod, internally and externally. Inside, stare 
decisis served to fracture the Court along apparently ideological lines.114 
 109.  Christopher J. Walker, Gorsuch on Chevron Deference, Round II, YALE J. ON REG.: 
NOTICE & COMMENT (Mar. 23, 2017), http://yalejreg.com/nc/gorsuch-on-chevron-deference-round-
ii/ [https://perma.cc/5W98-9W8K]. 
 110.  See Hessick, supra note 46, at 427 (“[T]he Chief Justice might think Chevron and Auer are 
bad ideas, but I doubt [he is] ready to declare them unconstitutional.”). 
111.  Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 615 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
112.  City of Arlington, Texas v. F.C.C., 569 U.S. 290, 312 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
113.  Id. at 327 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). He also warned that “the growing power of the 
administrative state cannot be dismissed.” Id. at 315. 
 114.  See Jonathan H. Adler, Is This Still the Stare Decisis Court?, REASON: VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (June 24, 2019, 9:31 AM), https://reason.com/2019/06/24/is-this-still-the-stare-decisis-
court/?itm_source=parsely-api [https://perma.cc/KG8Y-FUWW] (noting that “Justice Elena Kagan’s 
sharp dissent in Knick v. Township of Scott [in 2019] raised the concern that the Court’s conservative 
majority is showing insufficient concern for prior precedent, as did Justice Breyer’s earlier dissent in 
Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt.”); Henry Gass, Overruled: Is Precedent in Danger at the Supreme 
Court?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 25, 2019), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/ 
Justice/2019/0625/Overruled-Is-precedent-in-danger-at-the-Supreme-Court [https://perma.cc/73JV-
UXKF] (explaining that Supreme Court justices have long debated when to overturn precedent, and 
“with a reliably conservative five-justice majority, that debate has surged back to prominence”).  
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Externally, stare decisis (and the divided Court that resulted) drew 
considerable criticism upon the Court.115 For these reasons, stare decisis 
ultimately played a significant role in the outcome in Kisor. 
A. Benefits and drawbacks of stare decisis 
The term “stare decisis” is derived from stare decisis et non quieta 
movere, which means “stand by the thing decided and do not disturb the 
calm.”116 As a legal principle, stare decisis was imported as a feature of 
the English common law system.117 In 1788, describing his vision for the 
judiciary, Alexander Hamilton explained that “[t]o avoid an arbitrary 
discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down 
by strict rules and precedents . . . .”118 The Supreme Court expanded on 
this view, describing stare decisis as “a basic self-governing principle 
within the Judicial Branch, which is entrusted with the sensitive and 
difficult task of fashioning and preserving a jurisprudential system that is 
not based upon ‘an arbitrary discretion.’”119 
In practice, stare decisis obliges courts to follow prior decisions in 
two directions: vertically and horizontally. Vertically, within a given 
jurisdiction, the decisions of higher courts legally control those of the 
courts below. Horizontally, stare decisis gives prior decisions authority, 
even controlling force, over subsequent decisions of that same court on 
the same legal question.120 
Generally, support for stare decisis derives from the numerous 
benefits it provides. First, it ensures stability, protecting reliance on 
 115.  See, e.g., So Long Stare Decisis, ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE: BLOG (Aug. 16, 2019), 
https://www.afj.org/article/so-long-stare-decisis/ [https://perma.cc/PFV7-8RGD] (“We have every 
reason to worry that the Court’s five conservatives will continue to disregard decades of precedent to 
benefit themselves and their right-wing allies.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Does Precedent Matter to 
Conservative Justices on the Roberts Court?, ABA JOURNAL (June 27, 2019, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky-precedent-matters-little-to-conservatives-on-
the-roberts-court [https://perma.cc/Y97P-EUUX] (“Recent decisions of the Roberts Court indicate 
that the five conservative justices overall will give little deference to precedents that they want to 
overrule.”). 
 116.  Thomas G. Field III, The Role of Stare Decisis in the Federal Court, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 203, 
204 (1999) (quoting James C. Rehnquist, The Power That Shall be Vested in a Precedent: Stare 
Decisis, the Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66 BOS. L. REV. 345, 346 (1986)).  
117.  See id. at 204‒05.  
118.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 490 (Alexander Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed., 1888). 
119.  Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) (quoting THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 78, at 490 (Alexander Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed., 1888)). 
120.  LIEF H. CARTER & THOMAS F. BURKE, REASON IN LAW 47 (9th ed. 2016). 
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judicial decisions as “settled law.”121 Such stability, in turn, promotes 
fairness, because like cases produce like decisions,122 and judicial 
efficiency, as courts relying on earlier decisions may decide the 
subsequent cases more quickly.123 Finally, stare decisis “contributes to the 
actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”124 Some, including 
the late Justice Brandeis, have even gone so far as to suggest that 
consistency in the law, based on stare decisis, is more important than 
getting the law “right.”125 
Arguments in opposition to stare decisis have generally focused on 
three primary criticisms. First, to the last point above, stare decisis urges 
 121.  Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (“Stare decisis is the preferred course 
because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, 
[and] fosters reliance on judicial decisions . . . .”). 
 122.  Michael Gentithes, Precedent, Humility, and Justice, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 835, 
845–46 (2012) (“[A] strong theory of precedent is encapsulated by the intuitively appealing doctrine 
of treating like cases alike. At its heart, this view suggests that precedent is vital . . . to achieve 
consistency in adjudicatory outcomes . . . . Fairness seems to demand that claims that are identical in 
all respects other than the time they were raised be resolved the same way . . . . If a meaningful 
distinction between the cases is lacking, then it only seems fair that both claimants receive the same 
result.”). 
 123.  See Jonathan R. Macey, The Internal and External Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 93, 108 (1989) (noting that stare decisis provides economic value to the legal 
system “because it lowers uncertainty and hence reduces transaction costs”); BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, 
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921) (addressing the inefficiency that would result 
without stare decisis, and noting that “the labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking 
point if every past decision could be reopened in every case, and one could not lay one’s own course 
of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before him”). 
 124.  Payne, 501 U.S. at 827. Also note that much has been made of stare decisis as a significant 
contributor to the integrity and reputation of the courts, particularly that of the Supreme Court. E.g., 
Rafael Gely, Of Sinking and Escalating: A (Somewhat) New Look at Stare Decisis, 60 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 89, 107 (1998) (“Stare decisis allows courts to strengthen their reputation by promoting the 
perception that decisions are consistent over time. Thus, not only fairness in fact, but the appearance 
of fairness, are advanced as rationales for the use of stare decisis.”); Leah Litman & Seth Davis, A 
Momentous Change May be Upon the Supreme Court, WASH. POST (June 26, 2019, 10:04 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/06/27/progressive-supreme-court-justices-are-
sounding-warning-we-should-heed-it/ [https://perma.cc/SP2P-SMF7] (“The doctrine of stare decisis 
ensures stability in the law, protects private parties who rely on the law and helps preserve the court’s 
reputation as a nonpartisan — or at least not entirely partisan — institution.”). But see Ilya Shapiro, 
How the Supreme Court Undermines its own Legitimacy, WASH. EXAMINER (July 18, 2019, 11:00 
PM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/how-the-supreme-court-undermines-its-own-
legitimacy [https://perma.cc/MP46-KGE4] (describing how one’s view of stare decisis, among other 
factors, as impacting the legitimacy of the Court “now also parallels where you sit politically,” asking 
“is there any doubt that a progressive majority would act the same way toward conservative 
shibboleths?”). 
 125.  Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(“Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the 
applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”). 
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that past wrong decisions remain in force,126 which can then perpetuate 
through subsequent rulings based on the earlier wrong ones.127 Second, 
stare decisis places all emphasis on prior decisions, not on prior decision-
making.128 As such, judges can “pick and choose” earlier holdings that 
provide the conclusion they seek in the present case, giving the judiciary 
the power to legislate from the bench.129 Some have argued further that 
stare decisis, at least to some extent, subverts130 the very role of the judge 
to “say what the law is.”131 Based on this perspective, stare decisis 
encourages a form of intellectual laziness among judges who can rely on 
precedent rather than embarking anew on a thorough legal analysis of a 
given case.132 Alternatively, this suggests that stare decisis puts judicial 
power in the hands of judges and justices of the past, which, according to 
Justices Scalia and Douglas, undercuts the current judge’s duty to the 
Constitution.133 Third, and finally, reliance on past decisions restricts the 
 126.  Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare 
Decisis, 105 YALE L.J. 2031, 2040 (1996) (“[S]tare decisis sometimes requires perpetuating 
erroneous decisions in the name of consistency.”). 
 127.  Id. at 2033–34 (“A single erroneous court decision, if followed, becomes two erroneous 
decisions, then three, and soon a ‘line’ of cases.”).  
 128.  See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 576 (1987) (“If precedent is seen 
as a rule directing a decisionmaker to take prior decisions into account, then it follows that a pure 
argument from precedent, unlike an argument from experience, depends only on the results of those 
decisions, and not on the validity of the reasons supporting those results.”). 
 129.  See generally Adam N. Steinman, To Say What the Law Is: Rules, Results, and the Dangers 
of Inferential Stare Decisis, 99 VA. L. REV. 1737, 1743–45 (2013). See also Peters, supra note 125, 
at 2034 (“Courts may be adept at manipulating precedent to reach decisions they want to reach . . . .”). 
 130.  Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
23, 26 (1994). “This is the true import of Chief Justice Marshall’s oft-misunderstood injunction that 
‘[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.’ The court 
must decide the case in accordance with law, and a vital part of the judicial task is to determine 
whether a claimed source of law—even one that seems prima facie to be a proper subject of judicial 
cognizance—may be inapplicable to the case at hand because it conflicts with some hierarchically 
superior legal source.” (quoting Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). 
131.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 132.  See Macey, supra note 122, at 102 (“[N]ot even the best judges go about formulating what 
they believe to be the substantively correct legal result in every case, and then checking that result 
with the relevant precedents. Instead, judges generally employ stare decisis precisely because it 
enables them to avoid having to rethink the merits of particular legal doctrine. Instead of rethinking, 
the judges can ‘free-ride’ on the opinions of previous judges.”). 
133.  South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 825 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I agree with 
Justice Douglas: ‘A judge looking at a constitutional decision may have compulsions to revere past 
history and accept what was once written. But he remembers above all else that it is the Constitution 
which he swore to support and defend, not the gloss which his predecessors may have put on it.’” 
(quoting William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 736 (1949))). 
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judiciary in its ability to respond to the “mores of the day,” the current 
social and political environments, and modern standards of justice.134 
For these reasons, courts have reserved the right―perhaps the 
responsibility―to overturn precedent under certain conditions. In 
simplest terms, stare decisis gives way when the court has valid legal 
grounds for doing so.135 When the prior decision that governs the current 
one is poorly reasoned or fails to reflect current realities or standards, the 
Court “has never felt constrained to follow precedent.”136 Thus, in 
practice, stare decisis is generally a flexible doctrine.137 
To this point, the Supreme Court has previously established that, in 
overturning settled precedent, the Court must go beyond the mere belief 
that the prior holding was erroneous and find “special justification.”138 
The Court has relied on a variety of factors to form the basis of such 
special justification. In Janus v. American Federation of State, County, 
and Municipal Employees, Council 31, the Court held that the inquiry into 
whether to set aside stare decisis should include considerations of five 
such factors: “the quality of reasoning [behind the prior decision], the 
workability of the rule it establishe[s], its consistency with other related 
decisions, developments since the decision was handed down, and 
reliance on the decision.”139 
B. Overturning precedent in the Roberts Court 
John Roberts assumed his position as Chief Justice in 2005. Since 
that time, the Court moved to either directly overrule or at least sidestep 
established precedent on three occasions between 2005 and 2016. 
 134.  See James C. Rehnquist, The Power That Shall Be Vested in a Precedent: Stare Decisis, 
the Constitution, and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U. L. REV. 345, 348 (1986) (“[N]o discussion of stare 
decisis can ignore the stark tension between the doctrine’s literal command—obey precedents!—and 
the law’s ability to respond to social change.”); Field, supra note 116, at 207–08 (“[T]here are limits 
to stare decisis. Our system of law is organic: It constantly evolves and adapts with the changing 
needs of society.” (citing generally William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 735–
36 (1949))). 
 135.  See Parisis G. Filippatos, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Protection of Civil Rights 
and Liberties in the Rehnquist Court, 11 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 335, 339 (1991). 
136.  Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944). 
 137.  See Peters, supra note 125, at 2034 (“[T]he rule of stare decisis as currently observed in 
Anglo-American law is not a strict one: Courts can decline to follow their own previous decisions 
when those precedents are judged to be clearly in error.”). 
138.  Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984) (“Although adherence to precedent is not 
rigidly required in constitutional cases, any departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands 
special justification.”). 
 139.  Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478–79 
(2018). 
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In 2008, in District of Columbia v. Heller, the Court broadened 
Second Amendment protections for firearm possession, distinguishing a 
69-year-old ruling.140 In 2010, in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission, it held that a ban on corporate donations to political 
campaigns was unconstitutional, overturning a 20-year-old precedent.141 
And in 2015, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court overturned a 44-year-old 
law when it held that marriage is a fundamental right of same-sex couples 
guaranteed by the constitution.142 In the two earlier cases, the Court was 
split five-to-four with the more conservative wing in the majority 
(consisting at that time of Roberts, Scalia, Alito, Thomas, and 
Kennedy).143 In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy joined the Court’s four more 
liberal justices (Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan) to form the 
five-to-four majority.144 
Following this, the Court then overturned longstanding precedents 
on three more occasions over the span of just two terms. In all three cases, 
the decisions were five to four, with the conservative members of the 
Court in the majority, and the liberal justices in dissent. 
In Knick v. Township of Scott, Pa., a divided Court held that an owner 
of a 90-acre property with a small family graveyard had a § 1983 takings 
claim against the town, overturning the 1985 holding of Williamson 
County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson 
City.145 In dissent, Justice Kagan attacked the Knick majority’s lack of 
 140.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). In a dissenting opinion, Justice 
Stevens argued that the majority was overturning United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), in 
which the Court held that the federal indictment of two men for transporting an unregistered shotgun 
was constitutional because the defendants’ possession of the weapon was for nonmilitary purposes. 
Heller, 554 U.S. at 639 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In response, the majority, led by Justice Scalia, 
argued that the Miller Court had upheld the federal statute as constitutional because of the type of 
weapon the defendants had possessed in that case, not because their purpose was nonmilitary in 
nature. Id. at 621‒22. 
 141.  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 318 (2010), overruling Austin v. 
Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 142.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 647 (2015), overruling Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 
(1972). 
143.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 572; Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 317.  
144.  Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 648. 
 145.  Knick v. Township of Scott, Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2179 (2019), overruling 
Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). In 
Knick, the town had passed an ordinance that required all cemeteries in the town to remain open and 
accessible to the public during daylight hours. The town alerted the owner that she was in violation, 
so she filed a claim in Federal District Court. On authority of Williamson County, the district court 
dismissed the case because the owner had not sought compensation first, under state law, in state 
court. The Third Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, overruling Williamson County in the 
process. The Court held that the state litigation requirement would result in no ability to appeal to 
22
Akron Law Review, Vol. 54 [2021], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol54/iss1/4
2020] THE COBRA EFFECT 133 
authority and disregard for stare decisis. “[T]he majority’s only citation is 
to last Term’s decision overruling a 40-year-old precedent. If that is the 
way the majority means to proceed—relying on one subversion of stare 
decisis to support another—we may as well not have principles about 
precedents at all.”146 
In Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt, a complex case 
regarding a state claim of sovereign immunity from private suits brought 
in another state’s courts, the Supreme Court again overruled a 40-year-old 
precedent, Nevada v. Hall.147 Justice Breyer, writing in dissent, 
specifically asserted that stare decisis “requires us to follow Hall, not 
overrule it.”148 He explained that stare decisis is important because people 
“rely upon stability in the law. . . . Each time the Court overrules a case, 
the Court produces increased uncertainty. . . . and . . . cause[s] the public 
to become increasingly uncertain about which cases the Court will 
overrule and which cases are here to stay.”149 
In Janus, handed down in late June 2018, the Court overturned 
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, a 1977 case in which the Court held 
constitutionally valid state agency fee schemes compelling public 
employees to contribute to the union.150 The district court in Janus 
dismissed the case on the authority of Abood, and the Seventh Circuit 
affirmed. But the Supreme Court reversed and overturned Abood, 
federal court if the landowner’s compensation claim failed in state court, under the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2171. 
146.  Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2190 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 147.  Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1490 (2019), overruling Nevada v. 
Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979). In Franchise Tax Board, a Nevada taxpayer sued the California Tax Board 
in Nevada state court for alleged torts and bad-faith conduct during audits. The Nevada state court 
allowed the claim to proceed and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed and remanded. A jury trial resulted 
in judgment for the taxpayer and the Board appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court, which affirmed 
in part and reversed/remanded in part. U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded. The Nevada 
Supreme Court, on remand, affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part. The U.S. Supreme Court 
held that states retain their sovereign immunity in such cases, overruling Nevada v. Hall. Franchise 
Tax Bd., 139 S. Ct. at 1490–91. 
148.  Franchise Tax Bd., 139 S. Ct. at 1504 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
149.  Id. at 1506. 
150.  Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018), 
overruling Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235–36 (1977). Prior to Janus, the Illinois 
governor had filed a claim challenging the constitutionality of an Illinois statute which authorized 
public-sector unions to assess “agency fees” on public employees who choose not to be members. 
After the district court dismissed the Governor’s action for lack of standing, the case was refiled by 
Mark Janus. Janus was a state employee whose unit was represented by a public-sector union which 
Janus refused to join for political reasons. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Janus and overturned 
a 40-year-old precedent. The Court held that the state’s assessment of agency fees from public sector 
employees without their consent was a form of coerced speech, in violation of employees’ First 
Amendment free speech rights. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460–62. 
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rejecting it as “poorly reasoned.”151 In a sharply worded dissenting 
opinion, Justice Kagan decried the majority’s dismissal of stare decisis. 
“Rarely if ever has the Court overruled a decision—let alone one of this 
import—with so little regard for the usual principles of stare decisis.”152 
C. The Court’s reputation in recent years 
While the Court’s reputation has ebbed and flowed over time, there 
are indications that it has taken a decidedly more negative turn in recent 
years.153 According to Jeffrey Rosen, a law professor at the George 
Washington University Law School, public perceptions of the Supreme 
Court are at issue, perhaps more than ever before. In a 2016 interview, he 
stated that “[t]here’s no question that citizens are looking closely at the 
[C]ourt.”154 
Poll data supports Rosen’s assertion. Gallup polls in 2000 and 2018 
reveal that public approval of the Court has declined in that time. In 2000, 
62% of respondents indicated they approved of the way the Supreme 
Court was handling its job, with 29% disapproving. In September 2018, 
the numbers were 51% approving, 40% disapproving.155 Polls also show 
that views of the Supreme Court are generally bifurcated along political 
party lines. Among Republicans, perceptions of the Court have skewed 
more positive since 2015 (from 55% then to 75% in 2019), while views 
among Democrats have grown less favorable (from 72% in 2016 to 49% 
in 2019).156 
Many factors have contributed to the recent decline in the Court’s 
public reputation. Perhaps, most notable are the controversies surrounding 
151.  Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460. 
152.  Id. at 2487 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
153.  See Tara Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 HARV. L. REV. 
2240, 2241–42 (2019) (reviewing RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME 
COURT (2018)) (“Although the Supreme Court has been subject to attacks in the past, recent decades 
have been a period of relative calm. . . . But things seem to have changed—and in very short order.”). 
154.  Gass, supra note 32. 
 155.  In Depth: Topics A to Z, supra note 33. The question asked was, “Do you approve or 
disapprove of the way the Supreme Court is handling its job?” Results were as follows: 2000, 62% 
approve, 29% disapprove, 9% no opinion; 2019, 54% approve, 42% disapprove, 4% no opinion. Id. 
156.  Claire Brockway & Bradley Jones, Partisan Gap Widens in Views of the Supreme Court, 
PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/08/07/partisan-gap-
widens-in-views-of-the-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/F5KN-53BG]. In a July 2019 Pew Research 
Poll, 75% of Republican or Republican-leaning respondents had a favorable view of the Supreme 
Court, compared with 33% in mid-2015. Meanwhile, 49% of Democratic or Democratic-leaning 
respondents held a favorable view of the Court in 2019, compared with 72% in 2016. The gap is more 
pronounced among the conservative Republicans (78% favorable in July 2019) compared with the 
liberal Democrats (40% favorable in July 2019). Id. 
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Merrick Garland’s failed nomination in early 2016 and Brett Kavanaugh’s 
dramatic confirmation hearings in 2018.157 In addition to this, the Court’s 
decisions themselves may feed the perceived “politicization” of the Court 
that “causes the American people to lose faith in the Court.”158 
Public accusations and criticism of the Court by public officials, 
especially the President, also serve to undercut the Court’s reputation. By 
calling the Court’s integrity into question, the Court’s reputation takes a 
direct public hit. Doing this also serves to erode the Court’s reputation 
indirectly by calling attention to the Court in a mostly political context. 
Even without taking any action, the Court may be seen as political by 
association.159 
One incident illustrating this point involved the president publicly 
criticizing the Court and thereby drawing attention to the Court in a highly 
political context.160 During his 2010 State of the Union address, President 
Obama condemned the Citizens United ruling, which had come down a 
week earlier. With six members of the Court sitting in the front two rows 
of the House chambers, the President directly chastised the Court for 
“revers[ing] a century of law.”161 Democratic Senators, surrounding the 
members of the Court in attendance, stood and cheered the President’s 
statements.162 While this was not the first time a President had criticized 
the Court or its decisions,163 this incident garnered attention. It also drew 
 157.  Tomasky, supra note 35. In describing the effects of recent events on the Court’s 
reputation, Tomasky referred to the Senate’s failure to vote on the nomination of Judge Merrick 
Garland as “breaking the rules” and how Justice Kavanaugh’s confirmation was marred by allegations 
of sexual misconduct. He also noted that multiple Justices have been confirmed by legislators 
representing minority support and that Justice Gorsuch was the first justice nominated by a president 
who had not won the popular vote. Id. 
158.  Hamilton, supra note 34, at 36. 
159.  See generally Pomerance, supra note 36. 
160.  Id. at 522. 
161.  Alan Silverleib, Gloves Come Off After Obama Rips Supreme Court Ruling, CNN: 
POLITICS (Jan. 28, 2010, 1:26 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/01/28/
alito.obama.sotu/index.html [https://perma.cc/6XZN-CM65].  
 162.  Savage, supra note 38. See also Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Gets a Rare Rebuke, in Front 
of a Nation, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/29/
us/politics/29scotus.html [https://perma.cc/R92D-VM2H], which includes a photo of the justices in 
attendance surrounded by applauding Democratic members of Congress. 
 163.  In 2008, President George W. Bush was critical of the Court’s holding in Boumediene v. 
Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), that prisoners held at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, had constitutional due 
process rights. However, here, the president made his remarks while in Rome during a news 
conference. President Richard M. Nixon expressed disappointment with the 1974 Court decision that 
ultimately led to his resignation. Nixon’s comments were delivered in a prepared statement read by 
his lawyer. See Liptak, Supreme Court Gets a Rare Rebuke, in Front of a Nation, supra note 161.  
25
Warczak: The Cobra Effect
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2021
136 AKRON LAW REVIEW [54:111 
some criticism to the President for being particularly public, personal, and 
disrespectful in his attack.164 
Another example occurred in early 2020. Senator Chuck Schumer 
made comments critical of the Court to a crowd of activists outside the 
Supreme Court building, while the Court was hearing arguments in a high-
profile abortion case inside. Schumer, the Senate Minority leader, referred 
to Gorsuch and Kavanaugh by name when he exclaimed that “[y]ou have 
released the whirlwind, and you will pay the price. You will not know 
what hit you if you go forward with these awful decisions.”165 Other 
political leaders quickly responded, rebuking Schumer for his comments. 
President Trump, for example, described the remarks as “a direct [and] 
dangerous threat to the U.S. Supreme Court.”166 Senate Majority Leader 
Mitch McConnell spoke out for more than fifteen minutes from the Senate 
floor, accusing Schumer of “bully[ing] our nation’s independent 
judiciary.”167 The verbal sparring, which included numerous senators and 
representatives, was joined by the media. One online political news and 
opinion forum, The Hill, perhaps summarized the entire debate most aptly, 
explaining that it was “igniting a partisan fight over the Supreme 
Court.”168 
D. Chief Justice Roberts seeks to protect the Court’s reputation 
The Chief Justice serves as the presiding officer of the Court, a 
largely administrative role prescribed by the Judiciary Act of 1789.169 But 
 164.  See, e.g., Bradley A. Smith, President Wrong on Citizens United Case, NATIONAL REVIEW: 
THE CORNER (Jan. 28, 2010, 4:00 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/president-wrong-
citizens-united-case-bradley-smith/ [https://perma.cc/54J6-LK4P] (“Tonight the president engaged in 
demogoguery [sic] of the worst kind . . . . This is either blithering ignorance of the law or 
demagoguery of the worst kind.”). 
 165.  Adam Liptak, John Roberts Condemns Schumer for Saying Justices ‘Will Pay the Price’ 
for ‘Awful Decisions,’ N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/04/us/roberts-
schumer-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/A73H-DZ38]. 
 166.  Id. (noting also President Trump’s statement on Twitter that if Schumer’s comments had 
been made by a Republican, “he or she would be arrested, or impeached”).  
 167.  Andrew Desiderio, Schumer Walks Back SCOTUS Comments After Roberts Rebuke, 
POLITICO (last updated Mar. 5, 2020, 1:03 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/05/chuck-
schumer-supreme-court-comments-121960 [https://perma.cc/3YVU-2EFP]. 
 168.  Jordain Carney & Harper Neidig, Schumer, Roberts Clash Inflames Partisan Rift Over 
Supreme Court, THE HILL (Mar. 5, 2020, 4:34 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/486207-
schumer-roberts-clash-inflames-partisan-rift-over-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/CU3E-9WQ2]. 
 169.  See Robert Longley, Duties of the Chief Justice of the United States, THOUGHTCO (last 
updated Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.thoughtco.com/chief-justice-of-united-states-duties-3322405 
[https://perma.cc/4PVH-7HS4], for a summary of the United States Chief Justice’s roles and 
responsibilities. See also Kristin Linsley Myles, Michelle Friedland, Aimee Feinberg, Miriam Seifter 
& Michael Mongan, Hail to the Chief, 48-Aug TENN. B.J. 12 (2012). 
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beyond the various procedural duties, the Chief Justice has also served an 
unofficial position as steward of the Court’s integrity and reputation.170 
Roberts takes this role seriously.171 His words and actions as Chief Justice 
reflect someone who cares about the Court’s institutional legitimacy, the 
judiciary’s place among the branches of government, and its position in 
history.172 According to author and law professor Eric Segall,173 “Roberts 
cares a lot about the Supreme Court as an institution.”174 In fact, according 
to Segall, Roberts may feel “that he’s the only thing that prevents the 
Court from losing all legitimacy in the eyes of the public.”175 
Of particular concern for Roberts is the perception that the Court is 
political or otherwise partial to the ideologies of the individual justices.176 
According to Sara Benesh, a political scientist at the University of 
Wisconsin–Milwaukee who was quoted in a 2019 article, “[t]he [C]ourt 
has this position institutionally where the only power it has is people’s 
 170.  See Morning Edition, Fear and Loathing at the Supreme Court ‒ What is Chief Justice 
John Roberts Up To? (NPR radio broadcast July 8, 2019, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/07/08/738930098/fear-and-loathing-at-the-supreme-court-what-is-chief-
justice-john-roberts-up-to [https://perma.cc/YHJ8-7AWM] (“[C]hief [J]ustices — Republican and 
Democratic, liberal and conservative alike — have uniformly believed that they have a particular duty 
to maintain public confidence in the [C]ourt as an institution.”). 
 171.  In her book about the Chief Justice, Joan Biskupic describes how Roberts “was . . . 
concerned . . . with the institutional reputation of the Court,” BISKUPIC, supra note 37, at 177, to the 
extent that, she wrote, “[s]ometimes it seemed this concern was overriding.” Id. at 197. In his 2019 
annual report to the judiciary, Roberts himself urged judges to “continue their efforts to promote 
public confidence in the judiciary,” and to do their best “to maintain the public’s trust . . . .” HON. 
JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2019 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 4 (Dec. 31, 2019), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2019year-endreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/FF2E-
B5DT]. 
 172.  See Melissa Quinn, John Roberts is Voting with Liberal Justices, But He’s Not One of 
Them, WASH. EXAMINER (Mar. 8, 2019, 12:03 AM) (quoting Brianne Gorod, Chief Counsel of the 
Constitutional Accountability Center, who said “[t]he Supreme Court’s reputation is something the 
chief justice cares a lot about . . . . [He] cares very deeply about the institutional legitimacy of the 
Supreme Court and the courts more generally”), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/
policy/courts/john-roberts-is-voting-with-liberal-justices-but-hes-not-one-of-them 
[https://perma.cc/KWL5-A8EF]. 
 173.  Eric J. Segall, GA. ST. U., https://news.gsu.edu/expert/eric-j-segall/ 
[https://perma.cc/3FSS-3GJ4]. 
 174.  Bill Blum, Supremely Conservative, PROGRESSIVE, (Aug. 1, 2019), 
https://progressive.org/magazine/supremely-conservative-blum/ [https://perma.cc/2S8M-22HS]. 
175.  Id. 
 176.  See Quinn, supra note 171 (“Roberts himself has publicly sought to dispel any notion that 
the justices — and the federal judiciary as a whole — are driven by politics.”). See also The Editorial 
Board, An Apolitical Supreme Court, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 25, 2019, 7:30 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/an-apolitical-supreme-court-11569454257 [https://perma.cc/RKT8-
54VQ] (describing how Chief Justice Roberts recognizes that people often see the Court as a political 
body, but wants them to understand that the Court does not function that way). 
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voluntary compliance with its decisions.” 177 Accordingly, Benesh said, 
the Court needs to appear to be above politics whenever possible, and “the 
chief is in a particularly important position on that.”178 
That the Chief Justice is protective of, or at least sensitive to, the 
Court’s reputation was evident in his responses to specific incidents where 
the Court’s integrity was questioned publicly and in a political context. 
For example, Roberts publicly expressed his distaste for the President’s 
criticism of the Court during the 2010 State of the Union address 
described above.179 “The image of having the members of one branch of 
government standing up, literally surrounding the Supreme Court, 
cheering and hollering,” he said, “while the Court―according to the 
requirements of protocol―has to sit there expressionless, I think is very 
troubling.”180 
Roberts has responded directly to attacks by President Trump as 
well. In late 2018, the President lashed out regarding a Ninth Circuit Court 
ruling to block his asylum ban, calling the court a “disgrace” and referring 
to the author of the court’s opinion as an “Obama judge.” The Chief 
Justice issued a statement in response, explaining, “[w]e do not have 
Obama judges or Trump judges . . . [but] an extraordinary group of 
dedicated judges doing their level best . . . .”181 
Finally, after Senator Chuck Schumer verbally attacked Justices 
Kavanaugh and Gorsuch in early 2020,182 Roberts condemned the senator. 
In a statement released later the same day that Schumer made his 
comments, Roberts expressed concern that “threatening statements of this 
sort from the highest levels of government are not only inappropriate, they 
are dangerous. All Members of the Court will continue to do their job, 
without fear or favor, from whatever quarter.”183 
It is not entirely clear what the Chief Justice is trying to accomplish. 
On the one hand, he may be seeking to maintain the Court’s institutional 
integrity by ensuring actual impartiality. Or Roberts’s aim may be to build 
the Court’s reputation based on appearances of the Court as an apolitical 
 177.  Henry Gass, Why Chief Justice Roberts is Moving to the Center of the Court, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2019/0326/Why-Chief-
Justice-Roberts-is-moving-to-the-center-of-the-court [https://perma.cc/YH3X-3TH9]. 
178.  Id. 
179.  Supra Part III, Section C. 
180.  Savage, supra note 38. 
181.  Barnes, supra note 39. 
182.  See Liptak, supra note 164. 
183.  Ariane de Vogue, Chief Justice John Roberts Rebukes Chuck Schumer for Comments About 
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institution.184 Either way, his public statements185 and actions on the 
Court, which include forging compromises and voting with his liberal 
colleagues at times, demonstrate that Roberts’s concern for the Court’s 
reputation is genuine and provides a clue as to how he best sees his role 
in protecting it.186 His vote in Kisor is but one example. 
IV. THE COBRA EFFECT IN KISOR: GOOD INTENTIONS, BAD RESULT
Kisor arrived amidst growing concern about the Court’s institutional 
reputation187 and at a time when the Court had overturned longstanding 
precedent on multiple occasions in the prior two terms.188 This section 
will lay out, first, how Kisor represented an example of Roberts 
attempting to create a compromise among the Court, deferring to stare 
decisis for the sake of the Court’s reputation.189 Stare decisis will then be 
critically examined for its value as a legal doctrine and as a means of 
preserving the Court’s public standing.190 Next, it will be shown that the 
result in Kisor, by which Auer deference was upheld but significantly 
weakened, represents the cobra effect at work. For all of Roberts’s 
intentions, his actions and the result in Kisor will ultimately do more to 
damage the Court’s reputation than to support it.191 From this, it can then 
be demonstrated that the Court must overturn Auer once and for all. 
A. Kisor revisited: Chief Justice Roberts plays centrist 
The decision in Kisor, in which the Court upheld but limited the 
reach of Auer, illustrates three prominent features of the Court’s 
jurisprudence under Roberts. None of the three have anything to do with 
agency deference. 
First, Kisor represents another example of the Court’s recent 
emphasis on stare decisis, as stare decisis was at the heart of the result. 
Justice Kagan, writing for the majority, explained that stare decisis 
discouraged the Court from overruling Auer.192 The Court, she asserted, 
 184.  BISKUPIC, supra note 37, at 197 (“With his focus on the public’s perception, the chief 
justice seemed more concerned with protecting the judiciary’s reputation than with ferreting out actual 
impartiality.”). 
185.  For examples, see Roberts’s comments described above, supra Part III, Section D. 
186.  See supra Part III, Section D.  
187.  See supra Part III, Section B. 
188.  See supra Part III, Section B.  
189.  Infra Part IV, Section A. 
190.  Infra Part IV, Section B.  
191.  Infra Part IV, Section C.  
192.  Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2418 (2019). 
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lacked the “special justification”193 previously deemed necessary for 
overturning settled precedent.194 Doing so here, she wrote, would involve 
overruling “not a single case, but a long line of precedents . . . going back 
75 years or more.”195 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Gorsuch alluded to stare decisis in 
explaining that the Court should have overturned Auer.196 Specifically, he 
noted that the substantial “reshaping” of the Auer deference test imposed 
by the Court was tantamount to overruling Auer.197 But because of the 
extent to which Auer deference dictates “‘the interpretive inferences that 
future Justices must draw in construing statutes and regulations that the 
Court has never engaged,’” Gorsuch argued that upholding Auer “may 
well ‘exceed the limits of stare decisis.’”198 
Second, Kisor also showcases the (perhaps uncomfortable) role 
Roberts is now trying to play: that of a centrist. Observers noted that 
Justice Kennedy had played the role of the Court’s centrist or “swing 
vote”―that is, a justice who might side with his ideologically opposing 
colleagues on certain issues, thus casting the decisive vote in strongly 
divided cases.199 Kennedy, himself, a conservative appointed by President 
Reagan in 1986, had gradually replaced Justice Sandra Day O’Connor as 
the “center of the Court.”200 Following Kennedy’s retirement in 2018, 
commentators began to speculate as to whether Roberts might take over 
as the Court’s center.201 
 193.  As noted above, supra note 137, the need for a “special justification” to overturn settled 
precedent was first suggested in Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984).  
194.  Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2418. 
195.  Id. at 2422. 
196.  Id. at 2425–48 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
197.  Id. at 2443. 
198.  Id. at 2444 (quoting Randy J. Kozel, Statutory Interpretation, Administrative Deference, 
and the Law of Stare Decisis, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1125, 1158 (2019)). 
 199.  Ephrat Livni, John Roberts May Be the New Swing Vote on the US Supreme Court, 
QUARTZ (Dec. 24, 2018), https://qz.com/1506186/chief-justice-roberts-the-new-swing-vote-on-
supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/S38V-RUB3]. See also Horace E. Johns, Nine Means to an End, 39 
TENN. B.J. 26, 32 (2003) (“Justice Kennedy has moved steadily toward the center of the court, and 
away from his solid conservatism . . . .”). 
 200.  See JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 40 
(Anchor Books ed. 2008) (referring to O’Connor as the “social as well as the political center of the 
Court”). 
 201.  See Pomerance, supra note 36, at 457 (“[O]ne could genuinely see the Chief Justice filling 
Kennedy’s shoes as the Court’s ideological center.”); Julie Hirschfeld Davis, With Kennedy Gone, 
Roberts Will Be the Supreme Court’s Swing Vote, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/us/politics/anthony-kennedy-chief-justice-roberts.html 
[https://perma.cc/G5UK-5KVF] (“The retirement of Justice Anthony M. Kennedy is likely to thrust 
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. into the court’s ideological center, making him the deciding vote . . . 
alongside a newly solidified conservative majority.”). 
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There are examples of Robert’s “centrist” efforts predating 
Kennedy’s retirement. Perhaps most notable was the 2012 case, National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.202 Roberts caught the 
wrath of conservatives after he voted in Sebelius to uphold the Affordable 
Care Act, sponsored by President Obama.203 In 2014, Roberts voted to bar 
a state action that would prevent a Native American tribe from operating 
a casino on land outside its reservation on the basis of tribal sovereign 
immunity.204 He then voted with the liberal wing of the Court in two cases 
in 2015. First, in Yates v. United States, the Court determined that a fish 
was not a “tangible object” for purposes of determining violations of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.205 In the second case, Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 
the Court held that states imposing a bar on the solicitation of funds by 
judicial candidates for their campaigns did not violate the First 
Amendment.206 In 2018, Roberts voted to deny the Trump 
Administration’s effort to reinstate its policy restricting grants of asylum 
for illegal immigrants.207 Then, in 2019, there was Kisor.208 
The third point to be drawn from the Kisor outcome is that it provides 
a specific example of Roberts acting to support and nurture the Court’s 
reputation. Political scientists have known for decades that the ideology 
of a judge is predictive of his or her voting.209 But the image of 
impartiality is what is perhaps most important when it comes to the 
reputation of the Court.210 Roberts has been particularly active in asserting 
 202.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). See also Adam Liptak, 
Supreme Court Upholds Health Care Law, 5-4, in Victory for Obama, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/29/us/supreme-court-lets-health-law-largely-stand.html 
[https://perma.cc/DH3Y-R8QX]. 
 203.  See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Chief Justice Roberts was Principled but Wrong in his 
Obamacare Decision, REASON: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 6, 2016, 4:19 PM), 
https://reason.com/2016/05/06/chief-justice-roberts-was-prin/ [https://perma.cc/PQ85-7DFY] (“[I]t 
was Chief Justice Roberts’s decision to defer . . . that demoralized constitutional conservatives.”). 
204.  Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782 (2014). 
205.  Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015). 
206.  Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433 (2015). 
207.  Trump v. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 139 S. Ct. 782 (Mem) (2018). See also Lyle 
Denniston, Supreme Court Keeps Asylum Limits on Hold, CONSTITUTION DAILY (Dec. 21, 2018), 
https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/supreme-court-keeps-asylum-limits-on-hold 
[https://perma.cc/78SQ-LT67]. 
208.  Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019). 
 209.  See C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND 
VALUE, 1937–1947 (Digital Edition, Quid Pro Books 2014). Pritchett argued that Supreme Court 
Justices and judges generally were biased and political in nature, noting that “[a]ny examination of 
the present-day Court must accept the fact that its decisions inevitably have a political character, and 
the real question is not whether, but how well, its justices perform political functions.” Id. at 45. 
210.  See BISKUPIC, supra note 37, at 9 (“Roberts understood that public regard was crucial to 
the Supreme Court’s stature in American life.”). 
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that the Court is an “apolitical branch of government.”211 Taking the point 
a step further, Roberts may be showing us by his use of the “swing vote” 
that it will be he who will serve to bridge the gap between the two sides 
of the Court, if not the country.212 
On multiple occasions, Roberts has expressed his concern for the 
legitimacy of the Court, often promoting the Court’s impartial, apolitical 
nature.213 For example, during an appearance at Rensselaer Polytechnic 
Institute with the school’s president Shirley Ann Jackson, Roberts said, 
“[W]e in the judiciary do not do our business in a partisan, ideological 
manner.”214 
Beyond his words, Roberts’s actions may be demonstrating his role 
as de facto steward of the Court’s reputation and institutional integrity. 
There are instances of Roberts voting with the liberal wing of the Court, 
reflecting his migration to the center. These likely represent calculated 
attempts by Roberts to move the Court in a particular direction, with the 
general goal of protecting the Court’s reputation. For example, observers 
have suggested that the outcome in Sebelius reflects Roberts’s concern 
that the Court’s reputation would have been damaged had it moved to 
strike down the Affordable Care Act.215 Pundits have argued that Roberts, 
who wrote the majority opinion in Sibelius, changed his vote and then 
stretched to provide a rationale to justify that decision.216 
 211.  See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Chief Justice Tries to Assure the Supreme Court is Apolitical, but 
Term’s Biggest Cases Present Partisan Challenges, WASH. POST (June 16, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/chief-justice-assures-the-supreme-court-is-
apolitical-hes-facing-his-next-big-test/2019/06/16/8603bac6-8def-11e9-8f69-
a2795fca3343_story.html [https://perma.cc/F8WN-YVU3] (“People need to know we’re not doing 
politics . . . .”). 
 212.  Livni, supra note 198. See also Richard Wolf, Chief Justice John Roberts Inherits 
Expanded Role as the Supreme Court’s Man in the Middle, USA TODAY (June 29, 2018), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/06 /29/chief-justice-john-roberts-supreme-
courts-new-man-middle/743208002/ [https://perma.cc/R8HN-USNN] (“With the retirement of 
Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy, the court’s most influential member by virtue of his ‘swing vote’ 
status, Roberts will move to the middle . . . .”). 
 213.  Roberts’s concern for the legitimacy of the Court is described in Part III above. See supra 
Part III, Section D. 
 214.  Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, A Conversation with Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., 
YOUTUBE (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TuZEKlRgDEg&t=1363s 
[https://perma.cc/G6YY-RQSB]. 
 215.  See, e.g., Grove, supra note 152, at 2254 (“According to media reports, the Chief Justice 
believed that the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate was unconstitutional. But after a barrage 
of criticism declaring that a ruling against President Obama’s signature legislation would destroy the 
Court’s reputation, the Chief Justice opted to change his vote; he then relied on a ‘strained’ theory 
that the mandate was valid under the federal taxing power.”). 
216.  Id. 
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Cases in 2019 and 2020 further illustrate how Roberts has voted 
against his more conservative tendencies for the benefit of the Court’s 
reputation. In Department of Commerce v. New York, Roberts sided with 
the Court’s liberal wing to block the inclusion of a citizenship question in 
the 2020 census.217 Roberts wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices 
Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor. In the decision, Roberts 
explained that the administration’s rationale for including the question 
“seems to have been contrived.”218 But he also noted that the Constitution 
does not block the inclusion of a citizenship question in the future. Roberts 
appears to have controlled the outcome of the case by way of a 
compromise, likely intended to avoid more criticism directed at the 
Court.219 
In June 2020, Roberts again cast a decisive fifth vote in June Medical 
Services v. Russo.220 Roberts joined the Court’s liberal justices in striking 
down a restrictive Louisiana abortion law, a near mirror-image of a similar 
law in Texas which the Court had struck down four years earlier in Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.221 In his concurring opinion in June 
Medical Services, Roberts specifically cited stare decisis as the sole factor 
in his decision.222 He dedicated the first section of his opinion to the 
importance of stare decisis, before embarking on a sharp critique of the 
Whole Woman’s Health holding, reiterating his dissent in that case.223 
Commentators were quick to take note.224 For example, The Economist 
217.  Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019). 
218.  Id. at 2575. 
219.  Lawrence Hurley, U.S. Chief Justice’s ‘Swing’ Role Shown in Census, Gerrymandering 
Rulings, REUTERS (June 27, 2019, 6:20 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-
chiefjustice/u-s-chief-justices-swing-role-shown-in-census-gerrymandering-rulings-
idUSKCN1TS3A4 [https://perma.cc/CD8Z-UZWU] (“The census ruling in particular showcased the 
willingness of Roberts to craft compromises.”). 
220.  June Med. Servs. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020). 
 221.  June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2113 (noting that the lower court’s findings regarding the 
abortion regulation in question “mirror those made in Whole Woman’s Health in every relevant 
respect and require the same result”); Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
 222.  June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2141–42 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“Stare decisis instructs 
us to treat like cases alike. The result in this case is controlled by our decision four years ago 
invalidating a nearly identical Texas law . . . . For that reason, I concur in the judgment of the 
Court . . . .”). 
 223.  Id. at 2133 (“I joined the dissent in Whole Woman’s Health and continue to believe that 
the case was wrongly decided.”). See also Gretchen Borchelt, June Medical Services v. Russo: When 
a “Win” Is Not a Win, SCOTUSBLOG (June 30, 2020, 12:31 PM), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/06/symposium-june-medical-services-v-russo-when-a-win-is-
not-a-win/ [https://perma.cc/SC3B-MBUP] (“Roberts spends the bulk of his concurrence on his 
disdain for Whole Woman’s Health . . . .”). 
 224.  See Jane Schacter, June Medical and the Many Faces of Judicial Discretion, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 30, 2020, 1:22 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/06/
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described Roberts’s vote as evidence of his effort to “cultivat[e] a 
reputation for non-partisanship at the Supreme Court.”225 
In light of these prior cases, most notably Sebelius, it is reasonable 
to believe that incidents of Roberts joining the liberal justices and casting 
the decisive vote in a case reveal his concern for the institutional integrity 
of the Court. Such concern arises from a larger sense of his role in 
protecting the Court’s reputation, beyond the specific facts or 
jurisprudential implications of any specific case. Kisor is no exception. It 
is telling that the result in Kisor, upholding Auer, came on the heels of 
multiple five-to-four decisions in a short period, wherein the Court had 
struck down settled precedents.226 It is also meaningful that the Court 
upheld Auer by the narrowest of terms, with the Court insisting that lower 
courts make a more concerted effort at interpreting regulations before 
deferring to the agency’s proposed interpretation. This outcome 
represents an effort by Roberts to offer a compromise―to appease the left 
by deferring to stare decisis on the one hand, while appeasing the right by 
restricting agency deference on the other. 
B. Stare decisis and the Court’s reputation 
As described above,227 one argument in support of stare decisis is 
that it plays a significant role in supporting the integrity of the judicial 
process.228 Reliance on settled law contributes to the public reputation of 
the Supreme Court as an institution.229 Legitimacy in judicial rulings 
depends on the influence of binding legal principles rather than personal 
june-medical-and-the-many-faces-of-judicial-discretion/ [https://perma.cc/V7P2-UDXU] 
(explaining that Roberts’s vote in June Medical Services was “significant” not only because “he 
determined the outcome,” but for its contribution to “stability in constitutional law”); Robert Barnes, 
Supreme Court Strikes Down Restrictive Louisiana Abortion Law That Would Have Closed Clinics, 
WASH. POST (June 29, 2020, 7:06 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/ 
supreme-court-louisiana-abortion-law-john-roberts/2020/06/29/6f42067e-ba00-11ea-8cf5-
9c1b8d7f84c6_story.html [https://perma.cc/G967-3XQE] (asserting that Roberts’s vote in June 
Medical Services “was perhaps the most dramatic example of Roberts’s new role as the pivotal 
member of the court.”). 
 225.  Justice John Roberts Joins the Supreme Court’s Liberal Wing in Some Key Rulings, 
ECONOMIST (Jul. 2, 2020), https://www.economist.com/united-states/2020/07/02/justice-john-
roberts-joins-the-supreme-courts-liberal-wing-in-some-key-rulings [https://perma.cc/5YXP-
WCXY]. 
226.  See cases cited supra notes 144, 146, 149 and accompanying text. 
227.  See supra Part III, Section A. 
228.  See Gely, supra note 123, at 107.  
229.  James C. Rehnquist, The Power That Shall be Vested in a Precedent, 66 B.U. L. REV. 345, 
354–55 (1986). 
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bias and political judgment.230 When the Court consistently holds its prior 
decisions as settled law, lower courts and litigants can function with an 
understanding of just what the law is.231 Stare decisis, therefore, provides 
for consistency in the law and in the Court itself.232 Such stability fosters 
reliance on the Court’s decisions,233 which also promotes greater 
efficiency throughout the entire judicial system.234 All of this presents the 
decisions of the Court as the product of an impartial, apolitical 
institution.235 
When the Court occasionally overturns precedent, with sufficient 
reasoning to back it up, little is said of it. But when the Court strikes down 
a prior rule in a high-profile, politically charged case, the result is likely 
to draw attention and criticism directed at the Court. The Court is then 
seen not as applying judicial discretion in reconsidering outmoded or 
wrongly decided cases, but “participating in an unceremonious ‘heave-
ho’ of both the prior decisions and the previously applicable standards of 
 230.  The link between the Court’s adherence to stare decisis and its reputation has been 
promoted frequently in the general press. See, e.g., Litman & Davis, supra note 123, (“The doctrine 
of stare decisis . . . helps preserve the court’s reputation as a nonpartisan—or at least not entirely 
partisan—institution.”). See also Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 411, 463 (2010) (suggesting that the Court’s concern about its own reputation may 
influence its likelihood or willingness to dispense with stare decisis, asserting that “the Court will be 
extraordinarily reluctant to overrule its precedents based on concerns over perceived legitimacy”). 
 231.  Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991) (explaining that stare decisis 
is “of fundamental importance to the rule of law” because, among other things, it promotes 
“predictability”). 
 232.  See Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1173, 
1179 (2006) (“[O]nly by following the reasoning of previous decisions can the courts provide 
guidance for the future, rather than a series of unconnected outcomes in particular cases.”). 
 233.  Hilton, 502 U.S. at 202 (explaining how stare decisis establishes reliance on precedent, 
such that in situations where both the legislature and individuals “have acted in reliance on a previous 
decision . . . overruling the decision would dislodge settled rights and expectations”). 
 234.  Nina Varsava, How to Realize the Value of Stare Decisis: Options for Following Precedent, 
30 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 62, 68 (2018) (“The most prominent rationales for stare decisis [include] . . . 
judicial efficiency.”). 
 235.  Litman & Davis, supra note 123 (“The doctrine of stare decisis ensures stability in the law, 
protects private parties who rely on the law and helps preserve the court’s reputation.” (emphasis 
added)). See also Geoffrey R. Stone, The Roberts Court, Stare Decisis, and the Future of 
Constitutional Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1533, 1534 (2008) (“[Stare decisis] is based not on the 
assumption that prior judges are smarter than their successors but on the need for consistency, 
efficiency, predictability, and the need not to overpoliticize the judicial process and thereby 
undermine its credibility.” (emphasis added)). 
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stare decisis.”236 When this happens, scrutiny of those decisions, and the 
Court in general, is likely to rise.237 
A public view of the Court as “overly partisan and result-driven” 
leads to “gradual erosion and crumbling of its bedrock foundation [and] 
the public’s perception of its legitimacy.”238 Following precedent is one 
way to avoid such arguments.239 However, stare decisis can only go so 
far. The Court’s reputation often hinges on what happens outside the 
Court as much as inside. 
To begin, whether people agree with the decisions in specific cases 
often influences their opinions of the Court.240 Some issues are 
unavoidably controversial, leaving the Court in the position of deciding, 
as Roberts himself described it, “whether the Democrats win or the 
Republicans win.”241 When the issue is itself politically divisive, the 
outcome of the case will be politically charged, and the public will react 
accordingly. Attitudes about the Court among those who agree with the 
decision will be positive. Those who disagree with the decision will likely 
have negative views of the Court.242 In this way, politically charged issues 
lead to division along partisan lines, both inside and outside the Court. 
Inside the Court, observers have noted that the Court has divided five 
to four along ideological lines on numerous occasions.243 That the Court 
appears to hand down so many split decisions is itself significant to the 
 236.  Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the 
Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 649 (1999). 
 237.  See Kozel, supra note 229, at 463 (suggesting that “the country ordinarily tolerates the 
Court’s occasional need to revisit precedents,” but that highly politicized cases are likely to garner 
more attention). 
 238.  Peter Irons, Has the Supreme Court Lost its Legitimacy?, NBC NEWS (Feb. 4, 2019, 10:46 
AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/has-supreme-court-lost-its-legitimacy-ncna966211 
[https://perma.cc/2JZ3-ULGP]. 
239.  Id. 
 240.  See Jeffery J. Mondak, Policy Legitimacy and the Supreme Court: The Sources and 
Contexts of Legitimation, 47 POL. RES. Q. 675, 676 (1994) (explaining that one perspective on 
Supreme Court legitimacy is based on public agreement, such that “legitimacy exists when the citizen 
approves of” the policy behind the given Court decision). 
241.  As quoted in Greg Stohr, Political Cases Test Roberts’s Efforts to Keep the Supreme Court 
Above It All, BLOOMBERG (last updated June 28, 2019, 10:40 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-28/political-cases-test-roberts-bid-to-keep-high-
court-above-it-all [https://perma.cc/UA4P-96CP]. 
 242.  See Grove, supra note 152, at 2252 (noting that some scholars have argued recently that 
“members of the public tend to support the Court if it rules ‘their way’ in salient cases”); but see 
James L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, The Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court, 10 ANN. REV. L. 
& SOC. SCI. 201, 209 (2014) (arguing that “institutional support for the U.S. Supreme Court is not 
polarized along partisan and/or ideological lines,” but reflects fundamental values that lead to fairly 
equal support for the Court between Democrats and Republicans). 
 243.  Cass S. Sunstein, Unanimity and Disagreement on the Supreme Court, 100 CORNELL L. 
REV. 769, 770 (2015) (“On many of the great issues of the day, the Court has been divided 5–4.”).  
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Court’s reputation, suggesting a general discord among the justices.244 
The impact is more profound when those decisions appear to run along 
ideological lines, as was the case recently in Obergefell, Knick, and Janus. 
Joan Biskupic describes this very scenario in her biography of Roberts, 
The Chief, explaining that such cases as Citizens United in 2010, Shelby 
County in 2013, and “a series of other 5–4 rulings . . . buttressed the 
perception that the Court majority was politically motivated and that 
Roberts was engaged in the partisanship he claimed to abhor.”245 Roberts 
himself has asserted that the Court’s legitimacy is “threatened by a steady 
term after term after term focus on 5–4 decisions,” which the Court must 
avoid, or it “[is] going to lose its credibility and legitimacy as an 
institution.”246 
Outside the Court, when politicians criticize the decisions publicly, 
they politicize those decisions and conflate the Court’s holding with the 
policy arguments for or against the issue in question.247 So much attention 
on high profile and politically charged cases tends to blur the reality and 
mislead the public. For example, the American people likely are not aware 
of the fact that nearly 40% of the decisions in merits cases heard in the 
Court’s 2018 term were unanimous, compared with under 30% decided 
by a five-to-four split.248 
Consequently, the Court’s best course of action vis-à-vis its 
reputation and legitimacy may be to do as Roberts suggested during his 
confirmation hearings: to “decide every case based on the record, 
 244.  Robert E. Riggs, When Every Vote Counts: 5-4 Decisions in the United States Supreme 
Court, 1900–90, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 667, 667–68 (1993) (“In the early decades of this century, when 
5–4 decisions were few and unanimity was the rule, critics of the Court often suggested that decisions 
by a single vote . . . were somehow illegitimate.”); Mondak, supra note 239, at 679 (“[A] 9–0 ruling 
may achieve a higher level of legitimacy than a 5–4 ruling.”); Tomasky, supra note 35 (explaining 
that “past chief justices worked to avoid 5–4 decisions on controversial matters [because] [t]hey 
wanted Americans to see that the court was unified”). 
245.  BISKUPIC, supra note 37, at 9. 
 246.  As quoted in Jeffrey Rosen, Are Liberals Trying to Intimidate John Roberts?, NEW 
REPUBLIC (May 28, 2012), https://newrepublic.com/article/103656/obamacare-affordable-care-act-
critics-response [https://perma.cc/43RA-2A5D]. See also Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts’s Rules, ATLANTIC 
(Jan./Feb. 2007), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/01/robertss-rules/305559/ 
[https://perma.cc/D9V3-MUF9] (expressing Roberts’s view that “closely divided, 5–4 decisions 
make it harder for the public to respect the Court as an impartial institution that transcends partisan 
politics”). 
247.  See Hamilton, supra note 34, at 35–36. See also Grove, supra note 152, at 2272 (“The 
partisan actions of the President and the Senate have damaged the Supreme Court’s public 
reputation.”). 
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according to the rule of law, without fear or favor . . . .”249 In fact, 
throughout its history, the Court has overruled its prior decisions on more 
than 200 occasions.250 Many of these cases are now applauded as 
examples of the Court getting it right.251 For example, Brown v. Board of 
Education (1954)252 overturned Plessy v. Ferguson (1896);253 Obergefell 
v. Hodges (2015)254 overturned Baker v. Nelson (1972);255 West Coast
Hotel v. Parrish (1937)256 overturned Lochner v. New York (1905);257 and 
Keyishian v. Board of Regents (1967)258 overturned Adler v. Board of 
Education (1952).259 Given the historical view, it can be argued that the 
Court’s decisions in these cases ultimately strengthened, rather than 
weakened, its institutional integrity, despite its disregard for stare 
decisis.260 
C. The result in Kisor was harmful to the Court’s reputation 
The decision in Kisor has generally been viewed, as Corbin Barthold 
and Cory Andrews described on SCOTUSblog shortly after Kisor came 
down, as a “small win for James Kisor; a big loss for the Constitution.”261 
249.  Roberts: ‘My Job is to Call Balls and Strikes and Not to Pitch or Bat,’ CNN (Sept. 12, 
2005, 4:58 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/12/roberts.statement/ 
[https://perma.cc/JCS8-UUMZ] (opening statement of Judge John Roberts during his nomination 
hearings before the Senate judiciary committee). 
 250.  A.J. Willingham, The Supreme Court Has Overturned More Than 200 of Its Own 
Decisions. Here’s What It Could Mean for Roe v. Wade, CNN (May 29, 2019, 7:31 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/29/politics/supreme-court-cases-overturned-history-constitution-
trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/GSB4-C2U9]. 
 251.  Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(“[I]t is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”). But 
see generally Thomas Jipping & Alexis Huggins, Yes, The Supreme Court Should Overturn Precedent 
Sometimes, HERITAGE FOUND. (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.heritage.org/courts/commentary/yes-the-
supreme-court-should-overturn-precedent-sometimes [https://perma.cc/3RNM-SME9]. 
252.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
253.  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
254.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015). 
255.  Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). 
256.  W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
257.  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
258.  Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
259.  Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952). 
260.  See Jipping & Huggins, supra note 250 (“Following a past decision simply because it was 
decided, rather than because it was decided correctly, would make it impossible to correct grievous 
errors such as Dred Scott v. Sandford or Plessy v. Ferguson.”); Willingham, supra note 249 
(explaining how many instances of the Court overturning precedent over the years “marked sea 
changes in American society and rule of law,” including Brown and Obergefell). 
 261.  Corbin Barthold & Cory Andrews, Symposium: A Small Win for James Kisor; a Big Loss 
for the Constitution, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2019, 2:19 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/
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As described above, deference to stare decisis alone does not ensure a net 
gain for the Court’s institutional reputation.262 Whether the Court had 
overturned Auer or not, it was a clear, decisive, and unambiguous holding 
in Kisor that would likely have provided a more lasting positive effect. 
When commentators are questioning the Court’s logic on constitutional 
grounds, as they have with Kisor, is there any doubt that the integrity of 
the law, let alone the Court’s public image, is equally questioned? When 
the Court hands down decisions in cases addressing politically charged 
and polarizing issues, commentators, politicians, and the public at large 
are likely to be more vocal in their support or criticism of the Court.263 
Strangely, while the Kisor result has drawn significant attention and 
commentary, the reactions ran from “muted pessimism” to 
“unenthusiastic optimism.”264 Even the legal analysts do not seem to 
know quite what to make of it. 
Two issues are at the heart of the criticism of the Kisor result. First, 
fundamentally, is whether Auer deference in any form represents a sound 
legal doctrine. This issue will be addressed in the next section below. 
Second, the Kisor Court did uphold Auer,265 but in a “maimed and 
enfeebled” form that leaves courts with less certainty as to when, whether, 
and how to apply Auer deference in a given case, moving forward.266 
Trimming what was a broad, and broadly applied, legal principle may be 
a good thing.267 But as one observer put it, “the cure for Auer’s overreach 
may turn out to be almost as bad as the disease.”268 Alas, the Kisor 
decision better illustrates the cobra effect than any legal principle—in this 
case, where the efforts of the Chief Justice undermined his intentions. 
In this case, the unintended consequences are far-reaching. 
Following Kisor, courts and litigants have to deal with “needless and 
2019/06/symposium-a-small-win-for-james-kisor-a-big-loss-for-the-constitution/ 
[https://perma.cc/J27U-U9Q3]. 
262.  See supra Part IV, Section B (“But stare decisis can only go so far.”). 
 263.  See Hamilton, supra note 34, at 35 (describing how highly publicized “above-the-fold” 
decisions draw more attention on the Court, often with politicians promoting their views about the 
results of those cases on political or ideological grounds and, ultimately, shaping public opinion). 
264.  Paul J. Larkin Jr., Baseball, Legal Doctrines, and Judicial Deference to an Agency’s 
Interpretation of the Law: Kisor v. Wilkie, 2019 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 69, 74 (2019). 
265.  Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2408 (2019). 
 266.  Id. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part). See also Schmitt, supra note 42 (explaining 
that the decision in Kisor resulted in “all this indeterminacy”). 
267.  See Sanne H. Knudsen & Amy J. Wildermuth, Unearthing the Lost History of Seminole 
Rock, 65 EMORY L. J. 47, 53 (2015) (describing how Seminole Rock deference, now referred to as 
Auer deference, was originally constrained and narrowly applied, but evolved and broadened in scope, 
and “courts began to apply the doctrine more widely in the 1960s and 1970s”). 
268.  Schmitt, supra note 42. 
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perplexing new hoops” in applying Auer deference.269 In the Kisor 
opinion, the Court outlined multiple steps that courts must follow and 
various factors they must consider to determine whether an agency’s 
interpretation should control (that is, whether Auer deference applies) in 
a given case.270 First, the court must ensure that the regulation in question 
is genuinely ambiguous.271 To do this, the court “must exhaust all the 
traditional tools of construction.”272 If the language of the rule is indeed 
deemed ambiguous, then the court must ensure that the agency’s 
interpretation is “within the bounds of reasonable.”273 If , after “‘carefully 
consider[ing]’ [its] text, structure, history, and purpose,”274 the court still 
finds the regulation to be ambiguous, the court must then go on to “make 
an independent inquiry” into the agency’s interpretation to determine 
whether it has the proper “character and context” to warrant deference.275 
In other words, a court can only consider Auer if it is really sure the 
regulation is ambiguous, and it should only then defer to the agency’s 
interpretation if it is both “reasonable” and worthy of such deference. 
But we are not done. To evaluate the worthiness of the agency’s 
reading of the regulation, a court must consider several factors.276 To 
begin, the court must ensure that the interpretation was “actually made by 
the agency,” by evaluating whether (a) the proper agency representatives 
provided the interpretation and (b) did so in some official forum.277 The 
Court’s guidance to the lower courts here is that they ensure the agency’s 
interpretation “emanate[d] from those actors, using those vehicles, 
understood to make authoritative policy in the relevant context.”278 Next, 
the court must verify that the interpretation is the result of the agency’s 
“substantive expertise.”279 That means the subject of the interpretation 
itself must be related to “the agency’s ordinary duties,” and not “within 
269.  Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part). 
270.  Id. at 2415–18 (majority opinion).  
271.  Id. at 2415. 
272.  Id. (internal quotations removed) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 
467 U.S. 837, 843, n.9). 
273.  Id. at 2416 (quoting Arlington v. F.C.C., 569 U.S. 290, 296 (2013)). 
274.  Id. at 2415 (quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 702 (1991)). 
275.  Id. at 2416. 
276.  Id. (describing the various “important markers” a court must consider, “for identifying 
when Auer deference is and is not appropriate”). 
 277.  Id. (“[T]he regulatory interpretation must be one actually made by the agency. In other 
words, it must be the agency’s ‘authoritative’ or ‘official position,’ rather than any m[e]re ad hoc 
statement not reflecting the agency’s views.”). 
278.  Id. 
279.  Id. at 2417. 
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the scope of another agency’s authority.”280 Finally, the Court advises that 
an agency’s interpretation “must reflect ‘fair and considered judgment’ to 
receive Auer deference.”281 
With the Court’s direction in Kisor, lower courts attempting to apply 
Auer deference now face many “new and nebulous qualifications and 
limitations.”282 As Justice Gorsuch lamented in his concurrence, “We owe 
our colleagues on the lower courts more candid and useful guidance than 
this.”283 The decision also leaves the courts with a form of deference that 
is, at best, weak284 and perhaps nonexistent.285 In fact, on three occasions 
in the Kisor opinion, the Court reminded us that Auer “does not apply in 
all cases.”286 When a court determines that it does, the new Court-imposed 
multi-step analysis leaves those courts susceptible to challenges on 
numerous fronts. Was the regulation genuinely ambiguous? Was the 
agency’s interpretation reasonable? Did the interpretation reflect the 
substantive expertise of the agency? Did the agency arrive at its 
interpretation following fair and considered judgment? The list goes on. 
As such, lower courts may elect to simply avoid Auer deference entirely, 
to sidestep the “indeterminacy” that Kisor now brings.287 
The resulting confusion among the lower courts, however they 
respond, is a serious and legitimate concern that also does little to enhance 
the Court’s reputation. Ironically, it was adherence to stare decisis that led 
to this result.288 In the Kisor opinion, Justice Kagan explained that for the 
petitioner, Mr. Kisor, to prevail in overturning Auer deference, “he must 
overcome stare decisis—that special care we take to preserve our 
precedents.”289 He failed to do so, Kagen asserted, because he “[did] not 
offer the kind of special justification needed.”290 Yet, the decision raised 
doubts about whether such deference to stare decisis was genuine291 or at 
280.  Id. at 2417 (internal editing and quotation marks omitted) (quoting City of Arlington, Tex. 
v. F.C.C., 569 U.S. 290, 309 (2013)). 
281.  Id. (quoting Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155 (2012)). 
282.  Id. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part). 
283.  Id. at 2425. 
284.  Id. at 2426 (asserting that the ruling in Kisor “has transformed Auer into a paper tiger”). 
285.  In his concurring opinion in Kisor, Roberts asserted that the difference between the
majority’s modified form of Auer deference and Justice Gorsuch’s preference to do away with it 
entirely, is “not as great as it may initially appear.” Id. at 2425 (Roberts, C.J, concurring in part). 
286.  Id. at 2414 (majority opinion) (quoting Christopher, 567 U.S. at 155). 
287.  Schmitt, supra note 42. 
288.  Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2422 (“[S]tare decisis cuts strongly against [overturning Auer.]”). 
289.  Id. at 2418. 
290.  Id. 
291.  In fairness, both liberals and conservatives have shown a relationship to stare decisis that 
may be best described as opportunistic. See, e.g., Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and 
Principle in Constitutional Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 402 (1988) (describing stare 
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least whether it was proper here.292 Either way, the Kisor result leaves 
several losers in its wake. First, lower courts will find that applying Auer 
deference in future cases is a significant challenge. Second, administrative 
agencies will now lack confidence that their interpretations will have 
controlling weight. Third, litigants will be unsure of what principle of 
deference, if any, applies in regulatory interpretation cases. Finally, the 
High Court is left with a record of having just “zombified” a legal 
doctrine.293 As Justice Gorsuch complained in his concurring opinion, 
“we’re stuck with it because of the respect due precedent.”294 
D. The Court should overturn Auer once and for all 
Evidence of the cobra effect is apparent in the Kisor decision. By 
compromising and deferring to stare decisis to avoid further damage to 
the Court’s reputation, Roberts’s efforts in Kisor appear to have done 
more harm than good. There are certainly numerous reasons why Auer 
deference should be shelved as a legal doctrine. But it is the fact that 
separation of powers is at stake that is most salient to the question of the 
Court’s institutional integrity. By allowing the agencies which 
promulgated ambiguous rules to provide interpretations of those rules, 
courts necessarily delegate their role of providing legal construction. In 
doing so, the courts allow an administrative agency to do that which Chief 
Justice Marshall famously asserted was the sole province of the courts: 
“to say what the law is.”295 
That the Court should overturn Auer is best understood in light of the 
arguments in support of Auer deference. These arguments arise out of the 
rationale the Court has provided over the years when deferring to agency 
interpretations, and outlined by Justice Kagan in the Kisor opinion. First, 
“the agency that promulgated a rule is in the ‘better position [to] 
reconstruct’ its original meaning,”296 simply because it understands the 
decisis as “a doctrine of convenience, to both conservatives and liberals,” proponents of which are 
“determined by the needs of the moment,” and explaining that those who seek to overturn a 
longstanding law today are often most urgently supporting stare decisis when the new law is later at 
risk of being overturned). 
 292.  Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2443–44 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part) (asserting that the majority 
was “pretending to bow to stare decisis,” and arguing that “[t]here are serious questions about whether 
stare decisis should apply here at all”). 
293.  Id. at 2425. 
294.  Id. at 2443. 
295.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803). 
296.  Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2412 (quoting Martin v. O.S.H. Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 152 
(1991)). 
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subject matter and the intentions of Congress better than the courts do.297 
Second, as the Court explained in Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., the 
need for “judgment grounded in policy concerns” in interpreting 
regulations makes it appropriate to allow the agency “to make such policy 
determinations,” rather than leaving such policy-related questions in the 
hands of the courts.298 Finally, as the Court in Kisor explained, “Auer 
deference [is] rooted in a presumption . . . that Congress would generally 
want the agency to play the primary role in resolving regulatory 
ambiguities.”299 
What the Court left behind following Kisor is a weakened form of 
Auer deference, which retains many of its drawbacks, while the few 
benefits are diluted. To begin, the Court weakened one notable feature of 
Auer deference: its power to bind the courts.300 Following Kisor, courts 
are only to consider applying Auer deference after determining they 
cannot crack the mystery of the rule in question, using “all the traditional 
tools of construction.”301 Before Kisor, in cases of agency rule 
interpretation, application of Auer deference went something like this: if 
the rule language was not “free from doubt,”302 then the interpretation 
provided by the agency that promulgated the rule was controlling.303 Thus, 
the first question before the courts was often not whether the statute was 
“genuinely ambiguous,” but whether the agency’s interpretation was 
“plainly erroneous.”304 And the answer to that question addressed not 
whether deference to that interpretation was due, as that was effectively a 
forgone conclusion, but whether that interpretation would bind the 
 297.  See Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 629 (1991) (describing the 
“significant expertise” needed to understand and properly interpret what may be a “complex and 
highly technical regulatory program”). 
 298.  Id. at 697. See also Martin 499 U.S. at 153 (“[H]istorical familiarity and policymaking 
expertise account . . . for the presumption that Congress delegates interpretive lawmaking power to 
the agency rather than to the reviewing court.”). 
299.  Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2412. 
 300.  Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (explaining that where a term is “a creature of 
the [agency’s] own regulations,” the agency’s “interpretation of it is, under our jurisprudence, 
controlling . . .”). See also Hessick, supra note 46, at 422 (explaining that, along with Chevron, Auer 
is one of “two doctrines of binding deference,” and explaining further that, under Auer, where a “court 
concludes that [a] regulation is ambiguous, the court will treat the agency’s interpretation as 
binding—so long as the agency’s interpretation of the regulation is reasonable”). 
301.  Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 
837, 843, n.9). 
302.  Martin, 499 U.S. at 150. 
 303.  Auer, 519 U.S. at 461. See also Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99, 105 (1971) (“[When] 
the meaning of the language is not free from doubt, we are obligated to regard as controlling a 
reasonable, consistently applied administrative interpretation if the Government’s be such.” 
(emphasis added)). 
304.  Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2412.  
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court.305 In that instance, as explained in Auer, the agency’s interpretation 
was “controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.”306 With Kisor, the Court changed the nature of Auer 
deference as a result of the many qualifications now required to show that 
the agency’s interpretation is worthy of consideration.307 
Even with such qualifications, the constitutional concerns about Auer 
remain. At the heart of the constitutional arguments against agency 
deference is the fact that it represents the courts delegating their 
interpretive, and thus judicial, authority.308 Article III, Section 1 of the 
Constitution vests the judicial power of the United States exclusively in 
the Supreme Court and lower federal courts.309 Alexander Hamilton, in 
Federalist Number 78, further established in 1788 that “[t]he 
interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the 
courts,” and “[i]t therefore belongs to them to ascertain . . . the meaning 
of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body.”310 
The constitutional concerns about Auer deference have been 
expressed by many of the Supreme Court Justices themselves. Justice 
Thomas shared Hamilton’s view. In his concurring opinion for Perez v. 
Mortgage Bankers Association, he argued that Auer “represents a transfer 
of judicial power to the Executive Branch, and it amounts to an erosion of 
the judicial obligation to serve as a ‘check’ on the political branches.”311 
Roberts, in his concurring opinion in Kisor, drew a distinction between 
Auer and Skidmore. “There is a difference between holding that a court 
ought to be persuaded by an agency’s interpretation [as with Skidmore 
 305.  Even in Auer itself, the Court made no reference to the challenges in interpretation of the 
regulatory language (whether public-sector employees are “subject to” overtime pay requirements 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act), but simply held that “we must sustain the Secretary’s approach 
so long as it is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Auer, 519 U.S. at 457. In 
determining that the “deferential standard is easily met here,” the Court then demonstrated how the 
Secretary’s interpretation of “subject to” was reasonable because it was consistent with the dictionary 
definition. Id. at 461. 
 306.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting Robertson v. Methow 
Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)). 
 307.  The various “qualifications” are described above, supra Part IV, Section C. But even before 
Kisor, lower courts had been attaching exceptions and qualifications to Auer, such that it was evolving 
in practice. See Kristin E. Hickman & Mark R. Thomson, The Chevronization of Auer, 103 MINN. L. 
REV. HEADNOTES 103, 110, 112 (2019) (“Exceptions and caveats . . . have profoundly transformed 
Auer deference” to the point that “[p]erhaps the benefits of applying Auer just aren’t worth the 
trouble.”). 
 308.  Hessick, supra note 46, at 426 (“The constitutional argument [against Auer deference] 
turns on Article III [of the U.S. Constitution], which provides that the judicial power shall be vested 
in the federal courts.” (internal edits and punctuation omitted)). 
309.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
310.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 485–86 (Alexander Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed., 1888). 
311.  Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 119 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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deference],” he wrote, “and holding that it should defer to that 
interpretation under certain conditions [as required under Auer].”312 Once 
a judge reasonably determines that Auer deference applies to a given case, 
the judge is necessarily relinquishing his interpretive authority to the 
regulatory agency.313 By contrast, under Skidmore deference, where the 
agency’s interpretation is persuasive, but not controlling,314 the court 
determines how much weight, if any, to give to an agency’s interpretation 
of statutory or regulatory language. All of the justifications for Auer 
deference, emphasizing the value of the agency’s technical expertise and 
policy-oriented considerations, seem to ignore the fact that “every day, in 
courts throughout this country, judges manage with these traditional tools 
[of interpretation] to reach conclusions about the meaning of statutes, 
rules of procedure, contracts, and the Constitution.”315 
There are two other arguments in support of overturning Auer that 
are relevant here. First, the doctrine of Auer deference is inconsistent with 
the Administrative Procedure Act (thus contradicting Congress’s view 
that courts are “to ‘determine the meaning’ of any relevant ‘agency 
action,’ including any rule issued by the agency”).316 Second, deferring to 
an agency’s interpretation of ambiguous rules creates an incentive for 
agencies to construct ambiguous regulations.317 Both of these arguments 
serve to emphasize further the disparity between Auer deference and the 
judicial role of the courts. By overturning Auer, the Court would have left 
the lower courts the form of deference prescribed in Skidmore. Courts 
could then refer to the agency as one source—perhaps the primary source, 
but merely a persuasive one—for its own interpretation of regulations, 
without the risks associated with Auer deference described here.318 
The fact that Auer deference is inconsistent with the Administrative 
Procedure Act is another way of framing the Constitutional questions 
 312.  Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2424 (2019) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part) (emphasis 
added). 
 313.  Id. at 2429 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part) (“Under Auer, judges are forced to subordinate 
their own views about what the law means to those of a political actor . . . .”). 
314.  Skidmore deference is described above, supra Part II, Section A.1.  
315.  Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2430 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part). 
316.  Id. at 2432, 2434 (quoting from 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018) to explain that “Auer is . . . 
incompatible with the APA’s instructions”). 
 317.  Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 69 (2011) (Scalia, J. concurring) 
(“[D]eferring to an agency’s interpretation of its own rule encourages the agency to enact vague rules 
which give it the power, in future adjudications, to do what it pleases.”).  
 318.  Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2447 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part) (“Overruling Auer would have 
taken us directly back to Skidmore, liberating courts to decide cases based on their independent 
judgment and follow the agency’s view only to the extent it is persuasive.” (internal edits and 
punctuation omitted)). 
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raised above. This may also be the most crucial argument for overturning 
Auer when the Court’s reputation is of primary concern. Allowing 
executive branch agencies to both write the rules and interpret them, 
establishing controlling legal authority in the process, violates the 
constitutional principle of separation of powers.319 Combined with the fact 
that such deference denies the courts of their interpretive role, upholding 
Auer only serves to weaken the judiciary and, with it, the Court’s 
institutional integrity.320 
All of this explains why the decision in Kisor is a case study of the 
cobra effect at work on the High Court, showcasing how the Chief 
Justice’s efforts were self-defeating. As a means of strengthening the 
Court’s institutional integrity, Roberts supported upholding a 
constitutionally questionable legal doctrine that usurps power from the 
judiciary in a form that places a significant burden on lower courts that 
attempt to apply it. Any stabilizing effects of abiding by stare decisis were 
more than offset by the destabilizing effects of the Kisor decision. 
Overturning Auer is the only appropriate next step for the Court. The 
question remaining is simply when that opportunity will again arise, and 
whether the Court will then have the courage to do it.321 
V. CONCLUSION 
The unexpected and confounding decision in Kisor produced several 
unintended consequences. The form of Auer deference left in its wake is 
narrower and, as such, more akin to Skidmore deference.322 This only begs 
the question as to why the Court did not simply do away with Auer entirely 
since the principle of Skidmore deference is already available to the 
courts. Additionally, the willingness and ability of courts to apply Auer 
are now in doubt given Kisor’s “splintered opinions and multi-factored 
tests.”323 Even knowing whether it is appropriate to apply Auer at all is 
 319.  John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency 
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 696 (1996) (“[A]t the end of the day [Auer 
deference] leaves only one actor—the agency—to write the relevant regulatory law and then to ‘say 
what the law is.’ This arrangement contradicts a central and strictly enforced commitment of the 
separation of powers . . . .”). 
 320.  Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2447 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part) (“[T]he majority’s attempt to 
remodel Auer’s rule into a multi-step, multi-factor inquiry guarantees more uncertainty and much 
litigation.”). 
 321.  Id. at 2426 (“The Court’s failure to be done with Auer . . . all but guarantees we will have 
to pass this way again. When that day comes, I hope this Court will find the nerve it lacks today and 
inter Auer at last.”). 
322.  Schmitt, supra note 42. 
323.  Schmitt, supra note 42. 
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sure to leave lower courts confused.324 Of course, the true unintended 
consequence of Kisor arises because of the impact it will have on the 
lower courts, combined with the disregard for separation of powers it 
allows. In the long run, Kisor’s legacy will likely be that it undermined 
the Court’s legitimacy. 
All is not lost. In their separate concurring opinions in Kisor, Roberts 
and Kavanaugh both leave open the possibility that the Court may one day 
reconsider Chevron deference.325 In truth, even Auer is still not entirely 
off the chopping block. As Justice Gorsuch prophesied in his separate 
Kisor opinion, “This case hardly promises to be this Court’s last word on 
Auer.”326 Perhaps the Court will one day call the cobras back. 
 324.  Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2430 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part) (describing Auer deference, 
following Kisor, as “a doctrine of uncertain scope and application” (quoting Hickman & Thomson, 
supra note 306 at 105)). 
 325.  Id. at 2425 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part) (explaining that issues surrounding Auer 
deference are distinct from those surrounding Chevron deference, and that “I do not regard the Court’s 
decision today to touch upon the latter question”); Id. at 2449 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part) 
(explaining that “like the Chief Justice, I do not regard the Court’s decision not to formally overrule 
Auer” to preclude reconsideration of Chevron deference (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
326.  Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2448 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part).  
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